


JPRS-TAC-89-024
14 JUNE 1989



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-89-024

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Commentary Views NATO Summit
HK0306051289 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
1 Jun 89 p 3

[Commentary by staff reporter Wei Wei: "Reaching a Compromise and Making Readjustment—Written After the NATO Summit"]

[Text] Brussels, 31 May—On the 30th when the curtain fell at the summit meeting—convened on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the establishment of NATO—the atmosphere was one of light-heartedness.

The developments of the summit meeting were a trilogy. The first composition, "lurking with crises," saw the view that the remote chances in reaching a unanimous decision were gaining fashion, with the result that some of the previously relatively optimistic observers began making more cautious remarks. The second composition was "the appearance of a turn for the better," in which Bush's new proposal for arms reductions came on stage. Hopes were raised and, though no results surfaced at the 29 May evening work conference, the pessimistic clouds started to evaporate. From the evening of the 29th to the next morning, "for a whole night" foreign ministers from 16 countries "debated fiercely." The last composition was "reaching a compromise." At noon on the 30th, the heads of the meeting made a declaration for the conference and a "Comprehensive Concept." The symphony ended and everybody went home, all of them jubilant.

The declaration—its French version having nine pages, the English having 10—totalling 37 articles and being "the longest declaration since the establishment of NATO," spelled out in relative detail NATO's political strategies. The "Comprehensive Concept" is even longer, which has 16 pages for its French version and 17 for English, and a total of 65 articles, concerns NATO's arms reduction strategies. NATO started working on the draft of the document in June 1987 and it took NATO close to two years to finish it. The two documents were intended to be a link to usher the past into the present and open a way for the future, and to sketch an outline for NATO's future strategies, its missions and functions. Thereafter, NATO can proceed along the direction laid down by these two documents. The journey will prove an arduous one and every step of it will be difficult, but at least there is now a line to tread on. That is to say, NATO will continue to extend cooperation with the Soviet Union and East Europe in a comprehensive manner, influence reforms in East Europe, and reduce, through arms reduction talks, the conventional and nuclear forces which are now deployed all over Europe to "their minimum." This will, step by step, shake off the post-war confrontational pattern and build a "new and peaceful political order" whose scope will cover the Atlantic Ocean in its western end to the Ural Mountains in its eastern extreme.

The determining factors that contributed to the realization of these two documents were the leaders of the NATO countries, in particular U.S. President Bush and West German Chancellor Kohl, who made mutual concessions on the short-range missile issues. First, on the modernization issue, the two countries had had "the sharp points of their contrasting perspectives face each other." The United States had insisted on modernization, and West Germany had been adamant in its disagreement. The postponement to 1992 of the decision to modernize in the "Comprehensive Concept" is a compromise on the side of the United States, and the agreement by West Germany to the statement that the United States will be responsible for research and development for the renewal of short-range missiles was in reality a concession to the United States. Presently, the so-called modernization means no more than its research and development. Second, the United States had persistently refused to negotiate with the Soviet Union on short-range missiles, whereas West Germany had insisted on opening talks "as soon as possible." At the summit meeting, both sides finally agreed to include short-range missiles in the negotiations with the following conditions: One, the short-range missile talks must be linked to talks on conventional forces, moreover the former is made contingent upon the latter. Talks on short-range missiles will not begin until an agreement on conventional forces is made and its implementation has begun. Two, during this period the Soviet Union must reduce its short-range missiles to the same number as NATO's—88 missiles. And third, even if an agreement is made in the short-range missile talks, its implementation must wait until the conventional forces agreement has been completely carried out. Viewed in this perspective, the United States has given up its position of "no talks," and West Germany its position of "as soon as possible." It seems that West Germany has made somewhat greater concessions. Lastly, there is the issue of the "third zero-option." West Germany had favored it. However, the two documents from the summit meeting evaded the issue, though the idea is clear that the short-range missile talks are to emphasize the "reductions in parts of the short-range nuclear forces." In practice this has negated the "third zero-option." It appears that West Germany did not press its own concept considering the firm stance held by the United States, Britain and France.

All in all, all sides involved made compromises and the summit meeting has achieved the easing of internal tension and making strategic adjustments. In future East-West arms reduction talks the status of NATO may be strengthened, but internal tensions have not been completely eliminated. This may reflect the different interpretations of the documents. For example, West Germany is of the opinion that the possibility of the "third zero-option," since it was not stated in the documents, has not been excluded. In other words, on the issue of eliminating all nuclear weapons in Europe, NATO will continue to have quarrels.

JAPAN

Spokesman Praises Soviet Disclosure of Far East Troop Data

Soviet Regional Superiority Noted

OW3005111189 Tokyo KYODO in English 1954 GMT
30 May 89

[Text] Tokyo, May 30 KYODO—Japan commended the Soviet Union on Tuesday for disclosing for the first time ever figures on its military strength in the Far East.

But Foreign Ministry spokesman Taizo Watanabe called the selective disclosures a gambit designed to mask the fact that Soviet forces in the region are numerically superior to the combined forces there of the United States and Japan.

Watanabe told foreign correspondents gathered at the ministry that Japan "fundamentally appreciates" the Soviet decision to make public the data.

The information was contained in an interview of Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov published in the Communist Party newspaper PRAVDA on Sunday.

The Soviet defense minister revealed that some 597,600 troops are deployed in the Far East.

Of those, some 20 percent, or 120,000 troops, are to be cut between 1989 and 1990 under a pledge made in Beijing on May 17 by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

"The data was published but a detailed explanation was lacking," Watanabe said. "We do not have enough information to make a proper appreciation and analysis."

He called for further "clarifications" from Moscow on how it plans to implement Gorbachev's pledge.

Japan wants to know such things as from which exact areas the reduction of ground forces will take place and the what kinds of forces and weapons will be involved, he said.

Watanabe, explaining Japan's positive appraisal, said that Japan has long been calling on the Soviets "to give more open data on their military forces in the region."

"But we cannot help but detect some arbitrariness in (Yazov's attempt to) show that Soviet military power in this region is not superior to the combined Japanese and American military forces in the area," the spokesman said.

He noted a tendency for countries to manipulate military figures for self-serving purposes, saying, "This announcement by the Soviet Union at this time is no exception."

Watanabe explained that while figures were given for large surface ships and nuclear-powered submarines, battlecraft in which the U.S.-Japanese forces have a numerical advantage, none were given on the total number of ships in the Soviet Pacific Fleet and no mention made of their numerical superiority in conventional submarines.

He also said that the figures only included cruise missiles with launching distances of 600 kilometers and above, ignoring lesser-range versions.

"Strengthening of Soviet forces (in the region) has been consistent," Watanabe said. "The rate has been much, much faster than the rate for the U.S.-Japanese forces in the region."

He said Japan has not yet decided whether to accept a Soviet invitation to observe a large-scale exercise of its Pacific fleet in the Sea of Japan from July 10 to 12.

"It is an interesting proposal but we have to check about the details before we say yes or no," he said. "We are now consulting with the authorities concerned."

Accepts Offer on Inspection

OW29051111689 Tokyo KYODO in English 1053 GMT
29 May 89

[Text] Tokyo, May 29 KYODO—Japan will accept the Soviet invitation to Western nations made Monday to observe naval drills to be held off northern Japan in July, Defense Agency officials said.

The officials said it will be a good opportunity to see "a piece of reality" of the Soviet Union by observing the exercise, the first to be opened to Western countries.

The agency officials expressed their intention to accept the invitation if made officially.

Although 15 Asia-Pacific nations, including the United States, Canada, China, North Korea and Australia, have been invited to the drill as part of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's "peace initiatives," it will not be a large-scale exercise, agency sources said.

The Soviet Union plans to hold a naval drill between July 10 and 12 in the northwestern portion of the Sea of Japan with 10,000 troops and 20 vessels, according to the official TASS News Agency.

The Foreign Ministry welcomes a Soviet invitation to its naval drill, a senior Foreign Ministry official said.

The official, who declined to be named, said the Soviet offer was "a good proposal."

But he said trust in the Japan-Soviet relationship is not mature enough for Japan to invite Soviet defense officials to Japan's military exercises.

Touching on Monday's announcement by Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov detailing Soviet troop strength in its Far East area, he said the unprecedented revelation represents Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost policy.

The ministry official also said the Soviet disclosure may be a step leading eventually to a Soviet military reduction in the area.

MONGOLIA

Further on Soviet Troop Withdrawals from Mongolia

Soviet Commander Mayorov Comments

OW2705134889 Ulaanbaatar MONTSAME in Russian
1350 GMT 18 May 89

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 18 May (MONTSAME)—Soviet fighting men are leaving the territory of the fraternal country with the feeling of international duty performed, Major General L.S. Mayorov, commander of the Soviet troops in the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] noted today at the press conference given to Mongolian and foreign journalists.

Several times, the Soviet fighting men came to the aid of the fraternal country during its difficult time and at the appeal of its people. This happened in 1921, and both in the Thirties and the Forties, when the White Guards acted as lords in the Mongolian land and when its independence was seriously threatened. Each time, the Soviet fighting men returned home as soon as their mission was completed and their presence was no longer needed.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops just started has specific features lying in its coincidence with the historical visit of the Soviet leader to the PRC and in the fact that it is being implemented in accordance with the specifically defensive character of the Soviet military doctrine, General L.S. Mayorov emphasized.

He also answered questions from journalists.

Figures on Withdrawals

OW0106115789 Beijing XINHUA in English
1132 GMT 1 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow, June 1 (XINHUA)—The first deputy chief of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, Bronislav Omelichev, said Thursday that the Soviet Union has withdrawn 11,700 troops and 2,300 tanks from East Europe and Mongolia as of today.

General Omelichev said in an interview with the official Soviet news agency TASS that the Soviet Union pulled out 3,350 men, 1,650 tanks, and nearly 120 pieces of artillery from Democratic Germany, and over 1,000 soldiers, 150 tanks, and more than 20 guns from Czechoslovakia.

Over 4,500 troops, together with 320 guns and 160 tanks stationed in Hungary, were returned to the Soviet Union, General Omelichev said, adding that some 2,800 combat personnel, 200 tanks, and roughly 170 pieces of artillery have also left Mongolia.

The Soviet troop pullout proceeded strictly according to the approved timetable, with on-the-spot supervision of foreign military experts and public representatives, the Soviet general said.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced last December at the U.N. General Assembly in New York that his country would withdraw six tank divisions, totalling 50,000 soldiers and 5,000 tanks, from Democratic Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary by 1991.

The Soviet Union will also withdraw 50,000 men, 850 tanks, 1,100 armored vehicles, over 820 guns, and 320 fighter planes and helicopters from Mongolia in the next two years, the Soviet leader said.

THAILAND

Further Reaction to U.S. 'Pressure' on Workers in Libya

Foreign Ministry Expresses Concern

BK0206095789 Bangkok THE NATION in English
2 Jun 89 Afternoon Edition p 2

[Text] The Foreign Ministry this morning expressed concern about continued US pressure for Thailand to withdraw some 270 Thai workers from a Libyan chemical production plant that Washington claims will produce weapons.

Pratyathawi Tawethikun, the deputy spokesman, said the Thai government was also worried that the US and Libya have not been able to normalize their strained relations.

"Under the present circumstances, the Thai workers at Al-Rabitah plant are still being used as pawns and they will continue to be vulnerable (to a US attack on the chemical plant)," he said.

He said he could not confirm a report from Washington that there are about 270 Thai workers at the plant.

Libya has informed the Thai government that there are no Thai workers there but reports from Washington indicate to the contrary.

The Foreign Ministry will send a fact-finding team of officials to Libya to observe the situation at the Al-Rabitah plant at the invitation of the Middle East government, he said.

Pratyahawi said a recent report by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs indicated that 294 Thai workers were working at the plant.

However, he said the Foreign Ministry received a report indicating that the Thai workers' employment contracts were on a short-term basis and added that if that was the case, the government will object to renewals of the contracts.

He added the US and Libya should seek ways to resolve their conflict through negotiations and that a US attack on the plant would tarnish the US reputation.

"There are still many other ways which the US can resort to end the production of chemical weapons in the plant if the allegations are true. One way is to try to end the supply of raw materials needed for the production of chemical weapons into Libya," he said.

In an ASSOCIATED PRESS report from Washington this morning, a State Department official said so far, the Thai government has refused to take action on the US requests, which have been made over the past several months.

"We've made our concerns known through the appropriate officials ... and not at a low level," said the official, who spoke on condition of not being identified by name.

There are estimates that between 25,000 and 75,000 Thais work in Libya. Workers from many Asian nations have sought employment in the Middle East, where they can obtain higher-paying jobs than in their homelands.

Libyan strongman Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi has threatened action against the other Thais in Libya if the workers at the chemical plant leave.

Government 'Puzzled' by U.S. Report

BK0306155589 Bangkok MATICHON in Thai
3 Jun 89 p 21

[Text] A highly placed source at the Foreign Ministry disclosed on 2 June that the Foreign Ministry was puzzled once again by a report from the United States about Thai workers at the Al-Rabitah plant in Libya. The ministry felt that this was meant as a pressure on Thailand. Thailand has not been notified in writing by the United States concerning this matter.

According to the source, the ministry would on 3 June check with U.S. officials whether the report was originated from U.S. official sources. If the answer was

positive, the ministry would ask for a meeting with U.S. authorities, possibly with the American ambassador himself, to seek U.S. clarification on the motive behind the report.

The source said he believed that the United States wanted to sound out the official attitude in Thailand concerning the possibility for the withdrawal of Thai workers from Libya. If this is the case, the source said that he can confirm that Thailand will not recall its workers from Libya unless those workers have completed their contracts and want to return home voluntarily. Thailand does not want to discredit itself as it still has to depend on overseas labor markets. Besides, the source said it could also be that, by releasing such a report, the United States wanted to block other countries, with higher technology than Thailand itself, from giving help to Libya in carrying out the project of the alleged chemical weapons plant.

Deputy Director General of the Foreign Ministry Information Department Pratyathawi Tawethikun said Thailand does not care whether the United States and Libya would be able to reach a compromise on the problem. But the fact is that Thai workers at the Al-Rabitah plant are being used as a tool in the bargaining and they have been under pressure. He said that the United States should try to solve the problem by peaceful means, such as by blocking materials and equipment for use in chemical weapons production from reaching Libya, which the United States once did, rather than by threatening to bomb the plant, which would also draw negative effects on the United States itself.

Pratyathawi said that Thailand will not support a renewal of contracts for Thai workers at the plant, and Thailand is sending officials to Libya to check the number of Thai workers there at the invitation of the Libyan authorities.

Montri Danphaibun, secretary to the foreign minister, said that Libya has assured Thailand that it will not expel Thai workers from Libya if there is a need for Thailand to pull out its workers from the plant at Al-Rabitah factory. Thailand, meanwhile, has made it a policy that no private company will be allowed to send workers to work at any places suspected of engaging in chemical weapons manufacturing.

A team of Thai labor officials reported after a visit to the area on 17-18 February that a number of 270 Thai workers have moved to another site about 100 km [as published] from the plant. They are completing their working contracts and will be returning home.

REUTER reported earlier that deputy spokesman of the U.S. State Department Richard Boucher stated on 1 June that the United States had made known its concern

over the presence of Thai workers at the Al-Rabitah plant. It hoped that the Thai Government was aware of the U.S. attitude toward the plant and also of the U.S. concern.

The official made the statement after THE WASHINGTON POST reported on the same day that the U.S. Government had requested Thailand to move out 270 Thai workers from the plant.

Workers Reportedly Want To Stay

BK0406030889 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
4 Jun 89 p 3

[Text] The 304 Thais working at the Libyan plant the United States says makes chemical weapons want to stay there, a labour official said yesterday.

The workers, who include 10 chemical engineers, were not interested in government evacuation plans because they considered the facility at Rabitah a safe place, he said.

Having completed the construction programme at the plant, the workers were now building a convention hall 3 km away, he said, but they have been told to be alert for US air strikes.

The Libyan employer has been asked to place three trucks on stand-by around the clock at the camps, 18 km from the plant.

According to the official, the employers had been told of the issue and they said they were prepared to let the Thais go, but none wanted to.

A Labour Department source said officials had yet to decide on an application by job agencies to send 200 Thais to the capital, Tripoli, and there was concern the group might go to Al-Rabitah.

Thai labour attache in Athens Pakon Amonchewin, who returned from Libya last Wednesday [31 May], said the workers would only be endangered by a daytime US air strike.

The attache said the plant would be forced to close if the Thais were pulled out.

So far, Japanese and West German workers have been pulled out in response to US requests.

In his report to the department, the workers told Mr Pakon security at the plant was very tight and they did not know what was being made there.

Of the 304 Thais, 10 were chemical engineers who went there without passing through the department and refused to give officials details of their duties.

270 Thai Workers Evacuated

BK0306033889 Bangkok THE NATION in English
3 Jun 89 p 3

[Excerpt] About 270 Thai construction workers were recently moved from a Libyan chemical plant alleged to be producing chemical weapons to another construction site about 10 kms away, an aide of Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila said yesterday.

Montri Danphaibun, Sitthi's secretary, said the relocation was organized as a result of negotiations between Libyan officials and a visiting team of Thai Labour Department authorities at Al-Rabitah, the town where the chemical plant is located in the Middle East country, during 17-18 February.

The relocation took place after the construction work at the chemical plant has been accomplished, Montri said.

"This policy is based on our commitment to the anti-chemical weapon agreement to which Thailand is a signatory," said Montri, referring to the stipulation that the signatories will not send people or equipment to chemical weapons plants.

He said the Cabinet resolved to withdraw the Thai workers from Al-Rabitah plant because there is an allegation that it is manufacturing chemical weapons.

He admitted that Joseph Winder, first secretary of the US embassy in Bangkok and a second secretary of the Australian representation here called on International Organizations Director General Kasit Phirom on May 18 to seek a briefing on latest Thai responses to the US call for the withdrawal of Thai workers from the factory.

Kasit reportedly told the diplomats that the Thai government adhered to four principles in handling the problem—firstly, the safety of the Thai overseas workers, secondly the Thai commitment to the anti-chemical weapon agreement, thirdly, preserving bilateral relations with both the US and Libya, and fourthly, seeking to alleviate the concerns of all countries involved in the US-Libyan dispute.

Montri said Thailand has done its best and therefore, he did not understand the report quoting a State Department official in Washington as renewing its concerns over Thailand's alleged inaction. [passage omitted]

BULGARIA

Army Daily Criticizes NATO Summit Documents
AU0206161389 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 1 Jun 89 p 4

[Major Vladi Vladkov article: "NATO: Paragraph... 52"]

[Text] Some time ago Pentagon consultant Philip Carber [name as published] warned that the Soviet Union may spring a surprise proposal on large-scale cuts that are much more radical than those proposed by NATO. The need for this warning was dictated by the realization that complex problems would arise as a consequence, problems that the West was not ready to resolve.

The 29 and 30 May jubilee session of the NATO Council confirmed these fears. The powerful peace offensive by the socialist countries that began on 7 December 1988 with M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the United Nations, caught the 16-country alliance by surprise and gave rise to numerous exchanges, misunderstandings, and even contradictions within it. These did not cease in Brussels, although they were concealed by the gloss of so-called Atlantic solidarity. This becomes apparent when one reads between the lines of both the document on NATO's overall strategy and the political declaration that were adopted at the Brussels meeting. Forms of words like "where necessary," "when necessary," "foreseeable future," and "suitable measures" were evidently permitted by the United States and Great Britain to appear in the texts as a compromise version in relation to the dissatisfied allies, as well as in order to soften the documents' threatening tone, so inappropriate for the new climate emerging in international relations. However, they add nothing new to the longstanding strategy of the North Atlantic Alliance, which relies on the so-called nuclear deterrent.

At the Brussels session we finally heard, at long last, the West's counterproposals in the conventional arms field. On our side, readiness was expressed to carefully analyze them and to reach an appropriate decision. However, concern is aroused by Paragraph 52 of the document on NATO's overall strategy, part of which reads as follows: "The interested allies appreciate the importance of the United States continuing to finance research and development of a replacement for the existing short-range missiles, in order to preserve for themselves the opportunity of choice in this field."

So how does it turn out? We are disarming unilaterally and, let us say, also accept the West's proposed ceilings on conventional armed forces, while all this time the NATO countries continue research and development on new tactical missiles, and even select them. They give us a guarantee that the question of "Lance" will be examined in 1992, but what is the point of this, since other lances are coming into being?

A strange paragraph, somewhat reminiscent of the notorious Paragraph 22 in Joseph Heller's world-famous novel "Catch 22."

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Defense Minister Kessler Calls Bush Proposal 'Positive Reaction'

AU0506192089 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 1 Jun 89 p 2

[ADN report: "National People's Army's Assignment To Protect Socialism Affirmed"]

[Text] Karl-Marx-Stadt (ADN)—On Wednesday [31 May] Army General Heinz Kessler, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] and GDR minister of national defense, spoke at a large-scale propaganda rally of the SED Karl-Marx-Stadt Bezirk leadership. Speaking before 1,800 participants in the conference hall of the industrial center, he conveyed most cordial greetings from Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council. Siegfried Lorenz, SED Central Committee Politburo member and first secretary of the SED Karl-Marx-Stadt Bezirk leadership, was also present.

Army Gen Heinz Kessler paid tribute to the great achievements of the working people in Karl-Marx-Stadt Bezirk in fulfilling in an exemplary way the decisions of the 11th SED Congress and the pledges for the 40th anniversary of the founding of the GDR. The powerful May Day rallies, the local elections, and the Whitsun Meeting of the Free German Youth convincingly demonstrated the affinity of the working people to the policy of the party of the workers class and stressed their pride in the socialist achievements, in full employment, the housing program, and the excellent care for children and young people in the GDR.

This is the convincing result of the consistent course of the Marxist-Leninist party, which is characterized by continuity and renewal, Heinz Kessler said. The policy of the worker-peasant state, which is aimed at the welfare of the people, is being successfully continued on the path toward the 12th SED Congress. This is also served by the comprehensive unilateral disarmament steps of the Warsaw Pact states, including the GDR, and their negotiation concept presented in Vienna on the step-by-step reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe. All this aims at creating peace with fewer weapons. From this point of view, the U.S. President's proposals are a positive reaction to the initiatives of the Warsaw Pact states and will be examined by them carefully and objectively.

As long as there are still forces working toward the removal of the realities that developed in the world in the wake of World War II, forces that are not prepared to abandon the so-called modernization of short-range

nuclear weapons and other armament concepts, and that strengthen the neo-Nazis and back their machinations, it is necessary to guarantee the reliable protection of the GDR and the peaceful work of its citizens, Heinz Kessler explained.

Being ready also in the future to do everything necessary—together with all allies—to protect peace is the assignment of the National People's Army, the border troops, and all GDR protective and security organs, Heinz Kessler stressed.

POLAND

Polish Envoy in 'Lively' Discussion at Vienna CSBM Conference

LD0206214689 Warsaw PAP in English
1840 GMT 2 Jun 89

[By PAP correspondent Andrzej Rayzacher]

[Text] Vienna, June 2—Another session of the delegations of thirty-five states taking part in the Conference on Confidence and Security Building measures in Europe was held today. A very lively discussion was underway focusing on two questions: Embracing military activity in the air and sea with confidence and security building measures, and a prompt convening of a seminar of representatives of thirty-five states on military doctrines and concepts.

Poland's representative Ambassador Wlodzimierz Konarski pointed out that after President Bush had presented disarmament plan at the NATO summit envisaging also covering airforce with reductions and limitations, one could hardly understand why NATO member states taking part in the conference of thirty-five states had not agreed so far to covering operations of the air force in Europe by confidence and security building measures. He voiced hope that the Western side would soon adopt a logical and satisfactory stand on this inconsistency in its stand.

Internal Affairs Ministry on Troop Reductions

LD0206230589 Warsaw PAP in English
2131 GMT 2 Jun 89

[Text] Warsaw, June 2—A spokesman of Poland's Ministry of Internal Affairs announced that concrete decisions had been prepared to improve the structure and reduce troops subordinated to the ministry.

This holds in part for border guards (WOP) who are to be reduced by half within two years. It will be possible to transfer gradually a part of these forces and their equipment to civic militia, especially in large urban agglomerations.

By the end of 1990 the total of disbanded units will include five brigades, one motorized regiment, one self-contained battalion, fifteen battalions contained in the organizational structure of other units, and thirty other, smaller sub-units.

EGYPT

Cooperation With Iraq on Missiles, CBW Denied
*JN2805090489 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0800 GMT
28 May 89*

[Text] Al-Shariqah, 28 May (WAKH)—Dr Jamal al-Sayyid Ibrahim, Egyptian minister of state for war production, has denied the existence of any Egyptian-Iraqi cooperation in the production of chemical or biological warfare weapons or in the field of manufacturing long-range or medium-range missiles.

In an interview with the newspaper AL-KHALIJ, the minister said that cooperation between the two countries is currently restricted to providing expertise and cooperation in the manufacture of protective devices used in chemical warfare, establishing some military industries plants in Iraq, and providing certain production requirements as well as some end products.

The minister added that Egypt does in fact possess a group of chemical plants. He went on to say: However, Egypt is not producing any chemical weapons. It is only producing devices used for protection from chemical warfare; and there are several countries with which Egypt is cooperating to develop various types of protective devices designed to be used in case of chemical or biological warfare.

Dr Ibrahim said that the Ministerial Council of the Arab Cooperation Council [ACC] has outlined plans for establishing joint military industries projects and added that specialized committees will prepare the details of these projects so that they can be submitted to the [ACC] summit to acquire the capital, prepare the cadres, and make available all the necessary requirements.

INDIA

New Missiles May Be Able To Deliver Nuclear Weapons
*51500125z Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English
10 Apr 89 p 12*

[Article by Ravi Shastri: "Indian Missiles at Takeoff Stage"]

[Text] India's missile programme has reached the takeoff stage. This is evident from the preparations now under way to test-fire Agni, a ballistic missile with a range put at 2,500 km in recent reports.

Several other third world nations are also well on their way to developing such missile systems. This proliferation accounts for the Western initiative to prevent the spread of missiles which may have the capacity to deliver nuclear and chemical weapons. Seven major Western

powers have now setup what they call the missile technology control regime (MTCR) to retain exclusive control over this weapon system. But such hegemonistic control may be difficult to establish as shown by the rapid strides made by India.

Indigenous development in India was accelerated by the integrated guided missile programme (IGMP) launched under Mrs Gandhi in July 1983, with an initial funding of Rs 380 crores. Though attempts to indigenise missile technology had been made earlier, such attempts were aborted as a result of bureaucratic red tape and the obsolescence of technology employed. A prime objective of the IGMP was to minimise delays and get the wheels of research and development moving smoothly.

Apex Body

As part of this effort, the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) at Hyderabad was made the apex body to coordinate research, with Brig (Dr) V.J. Sundaram, a physicist who had worked on solid fuel rocket propulsion, heading the research team. At the same time an effort was made to involve specialised agencies in the effort, with each given the task of developing individual sub-components. As a result, several research institutions and private companies have participated in the coordinated programme.

Given the overlap between satellite launch vehicles and long-range missiles, it is possible that several propulsion technologies developed by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) have been adopted for use in the missiles. Two major problems which DRDL would have to solve itself, however, would be guidance and reentry.

Three major guidance systems are employed for guiding missiles—wire, radio and inertial. The first two have inherent problems. The first two have inherent problems. Wire-guided missiles need a long wire in tow which tends to get entangled in foliage while the missile is on its initial trajectory. Radio-guided missiles are vulnerable to jamming. Inertial guidance systems in which a pre-programmed on-board computer charts out the missile's path is the most efficient.

Missile Tech

The soon-to-be-launched Agni, as well as the earlier Prithvi, are believed to employ inertial guidance.

This is a major achievement of DRDL scientists, given the fact that the sale of inertial guidance sub-components, such as high altitude gyroscopes along with advanced materials, are strictly controlled by the missile technology control regime.

The successful launch of the Prithvi in February last year heralded India's entry into the missile age. Though a short-range missile, not much of use as a nuclear delivery system, its high accuracy would make it prove extremely

effective with conventional warheads against such targets as massed troops, armour and dams. Its 1,000 kg payload capacity gives it theoretically the capability to carry a nuclear warhead.

However, the delivery of a strategic nuclear warhead over short distances such as 150 km would be counter-productive because winds may carry radio-activity back to Indian territory. To be effective as a nuclear delivery vehicle, a missile would need to carry a 1,000 kg warhead over a distance of at least 800-1,100 km. Even if the range of Agni is only 1,600 km, as is more likely, rather than the reported 2,500 km, nuclear delivery may indeed be within India's reach.

What payload Agni will be able to carry is not yet known. Reports indicate that Agni's first stage employs solid fuel while its second-stage engine is fuelled by a liquid propellant. Inertial guidance would render electronic counter-measure (ECM) techniques employed against the missile ineffective. Agni may, therefore, prove to be a potent long-range strategic delivery vehicle that could be the Indian answer to strategic blackmail. The possibility of India breaking the monopoly of nuclear weapon states over long-range missile systems has not gone down well with the nuclear non-proliferation establishment. In fact, some analysts have named India one of the prime targets against whom the missile control regime is aimed. Prithvi and Agni are only the most talked about missiles being developed by DRDL. A short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM), Trishul, with a range of 9 km has been tested a number of times and is due to go into production by 1990, while a longer range SAM, designated Akash with a 27 km range, is also believed to be in an advanced stage of development. A laser-guided anti-tank missile, Nag, may go into production by 1993. The mid-1990s may thus witness reduced dependence of the Indian armed forces on external sources of supply for their missile requirements.

Three Wings

As of today, all three wings of the Indian armed forces depend on missiles imported from the Soviet Union and France. With France and Britain already party to the control regime, and the Soviets likely to follow suit, future Indian missile requirements may come under increasing pressures.

It is imperative, therefore, for Indian defence planners to speed up indigenous research and development of missiles of all categories and potential capabilities. Recognising the need for indigenisation, the defence minister, Mr K.C. Pant, said in reply to Parliament question that guided missile is one area "where we want to be totally self-sufficient."

Striking Range

The past few years have witnessed the deployment of missiles in and around the south Asian region. Chinese ICBM's have in any case the range to strike any part of

India. Besides, a quarter of the 350-strong Chinese IRBM force is based in Tibet, according to some accounts. The Chinese transfer of the SCC-3 IRBM to Saudi Arabia and of the shorter range to Syria raises the possibility that such missiles could be transferred Pakistan at some future date, given the history of cooperation between the two countries in strategic fields.

In any event, Pakistan has now developed two new surface-to-surface missiles which were recently exhibited at a National Day parade. It is claimed that these have been developed indigenously though observers think that China's help with technology and sub-systems has played a very important part. The range of these is said to be 80 km and 300 km, and the payload capability, 500 kg. A third missile for use against low-flying aircraft has also been unveiled. It closely resembles the Chinese version of the Soviet SAM.

Gen Aslam Beg, Pakistan's army chief, has announced that the country's space scientists would be ready with a multi-stage rocket in the next 2 years. In sum, Pakistan is fast catching up. In view of these developments, the Agni test comes none too soon.

Commentary Views Missile-Based Defense System

БК3105110689 Delhi General Overseas Service
in English 1010 GMT 31 May 89

[Mahendra Ved Commentary]

[Text] With the successful test firing of Agni, India's first long-range ballistic missile, many questions are being asked about its purpose to which great prestige and significance is being attached and for which the nation can take justifiable pride. Actually, Agni's launching need not have raised this question. Already the Bharat Dynamics Limited, a public sector undertaking of the Ministry of Defense, is working on the production of Prithvi, the surface-to-surface tactical missile with an estimated range of 150 kilometers. It is the entry of Prithvi that will mark the beginning of integration of missile based defenses into the network of our Armed Forces.

The defense minister, Mr K.C. Pant, addressing the Economic Editors Conference in New Delhi on Thursday said that the integrated guided missile development program aims at developing capabilities for ensuring national security through missile-based defenses. However, while expressing happiness at the successful demonstration of a capability for developing missiles, Mr Pant said we still have some way to go before missiles enter operational service and they are integrated with our Armed Forces. This is an option which the country will have to consider in the coming years. The defense minister and earlier on the day of the Agni's launching on the 22d of May, the prime minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, had repeatedly stressed that Agni was essentially a technology demonstrator. So far as this missile is

concerned the position remains unchanged. As Dr Arnuchalam, the scientific adviser to the defense minister and the chief of the Defense Research and Development Program, has said Agni would have to be further tested. The scientists and engineers working on it would have to carry forward data in the coming months. The development stage is never over. They would definitely like to do more experiments. The significant thing is that it remains a technology demonstrator. For its integration into the military defenses, there would have to be a decision at the highest levels of the political and military leaderships of the country. This should mean that there is nothing instant about Agni, certainly not its integration into the country's defenses.

Let us look at Prithvi which is very much on its way to joining the defense system. The project was sanctioned in July 1983. It has undergone eight flight trials so far. The performance of its missile subsystems has been established. It was test launched in February last year and has since undergone further development. Its missile and ground systems have been perfected. Next to Prithvi is Akash, which is a medium-range air defense system with multi-target tracking capability employing command and homing guidance system. Akash has a high energy solid propellant for the booster and integrated

ramrocket for the sustainer. Akash is now undergoing flight trial preparation and its systems are being tested to achieve perfection. The first test launch of this surface-to-air missile system is due toward the end of this year.

The work is also going on the antitank missile Nag which is the third generation missile with advanced guidance system for achieving fire and forget capability. The Trishul is another short range surface-to-air defense system which is scheduled to be ready sometime in 1991. It will use high strength steel rocket motor chamber with composite propellant in dual thrust mode. The exciting thing about Akash is that it has multi-target handling capacity. Feasibility studies are going for Astra, an air-to-air missile system.

Coming back to Agni, Dr Arunachalam has said the place of its splash down in the Bay of Bengal was a pre-determined spot and it was accurate. All its systems worked well and its reentry was perfect. The parameters set for Agni have proved to be sound and the various systems effective and perfect. No doubt, the scientists have every reason to be feel happy. The task ahead is to keep testing it through more prototypes and prepare for a day when it has to be productionized.

**Blame Assessed for USSR Lagging U.S. in
SDI-Related Technology**
52000050 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 May 89 p 13

[Letter to the Editor from V. Bobrov, acting chief of the Laboratory for State Expert Evaluation of Inventions of TSNIIatominform, and interview with him by Igor Belyayev, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA political columnist, in Moscow on a date not given: "Dialog-Inquiry: Along That Road?"]

[Text] A letter came into the editorial office:

"Dear LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editors!

"In 20 years' work I have processed about 10,000 patent applications pertaining to inventions in the field of nuclear science and engineering. I have personally examined about 1,000 applications as a patent examiner.

"Fate would have it that in the period 1967-1968 and after 1973 I happened to have rejected the application to patent the RBMK-1000 nuclear reactor which exploded and burned at Chernobyl in 1986. Banished from TSNIIatominform since 30 July 1984, I have engaged in a study of the nuclear-pumped American Star-Wars weapon.

"The elementary basis of the nuclear and thermonuclear thermionic emission was first invented in the USSR over the period 1962-1979; without it the plasma laser cannot be built; beginning in 1977 it began to be tested and used in the U.S. This gave the Americans what they suppose to be a trump card that cannot lose in the form of a qualitatively new nuclear-energy technology with maximum efficiency. This technology can be applied on the ground and in space for peaceful and military purposes. The plasma laser device can perform the functions of a photon nuclear missile engine, a nuclear power generating device or a particle-beam weapon.

"Our public should know that Soviet inventions in this field over the period 1962-1979 have been gathering dust without application in the archives of TSNIIatominform. In 1977 it took the U.S. Department of Energy only half a year to decide the question of applying a key analogous invention under U.S. patent number 4151438, which it did in 1978. With corresponding appropriations of course. In the USSR, however, earlier analogous inventions under author's certificates numbers 61941, 65637 and 70216 still have not been applied.

"I am convinced that application of these Soviet inventions should begin immediately. First of all, to create a qualitatively new nuclear power engineering with maximum efficiency both on the ground and also in space. Our country has already been losing and will continue to lose tens of billions of rubles because of the failure to apply them."

V. Bobrov visited the editorial office. My conversations with him extended over more than one day. What follows is their quintessence. [passage omitted]

Chernobyl Need Not Have Happened

[Belyayev] Viktor Aleksandrovich, please tell us why the RBMK reactor was not recognized as an invention?

[Bobrov] For several reasons, including the absence of essential novelty and industrial usefulness. Nevertheless, the RBMK-1000 reactor was built in record time and put on line in 1973 at the Leningradskaya AES. A. P. Aleksandrov, member of the Academy who at that time was director of IAE, S. M. Feynberg and other scientific associates of that institute were indicated as the effective authors of the application for a patent on this method and the RBMK reactor, with priority as of 6 October 1967.

As a patent examiner, I examined the application dated 6 October 1967. I signed the rulings rejecting issuance of an author's certificate on it on the basis of the adverse conclusion of the Physical Energy Institute (FEI), the adverse conclusion of an enterprise headed by N. A. Dollezhal, member of the Academy and chief designer of the RBMK-1000 reactor, a conclusion which in the period 1967-1968 was evasive, but after 1973 was decisively negative, and an analysis of three publications of American and English physicists.

[Belyayev] When you examined this application, surely you yourself saw and calculated the very unpromising nature of this reactor?

[Bobrov] I have already said one of the reasons why the design was not recognized to be an invention was the absence of industrial usefulness of the method of reducing the cost of electric power using an RBMK with an antediluvian efficiency coefficient—only about 30 percent. It was this ground for refusal that was disputed by the applicant, who demanded recognition of his "invention" after it was applied to generate power in the nuclear power industry in 1973. In 1967 the first version of the application (one-and-a-half typewritten pages with no claim or drawings), I sent it back to the authors to be redone. That is why, so it seemed to me at the time, there was no question at all of any future for the RBMK. Then incredible things began to happen. The rewritten application for the patent on the RBMK dated 6 October 1967 still had not been taken up, but just a month later, on 10 November 1967, A. P. Aleksandrov, member of the Academy, announced in the newspaper PRAVDA (in an article entitled "The October Revolution and Physics") "that Soviet scientists had been able to solve the problem of increasing the economic efficiency of nuclear power plants." This was also mentioned in his book Atomnaya Energiya i Nauchno-Tekhnicheskii Progress (Nuclear Power and Scientific-Technical Progress). It is a collection of the author's articles and

speeches over the period 1962-1977 devoted to substantiating the conception of the RBMK reactor. The book's editor was the late V. A. Legasov, who at that time was a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the compilers were G. A. Kotelnikov, V. K. Popov and A. N. Protsenko, who recently became chairman of the USSR State Committee for Use of Atomic Energy.

The assertion of A. P. Aleksandrov, member of the Academy, about the supposedly "progressive technical level" of the RBMK reactor proved to be unsound, since State Patent Expert Evaluation also did not recognize this reactor as an invention in the USSR. The assertions of the member of the Academy that explosion of the reactor was impossible by definition and that the likelihood of a major accident was extremely small have been refuted by Chernobyl. The idea of the IAE physicists of continuous loading of the nuclear fuel from above and unloading of the core from below in order to guarantee its more completely depletion turned out to be technically unfeasible. The chief designer altered the scheme for loading and unloading: the fuel was loaded into the RBMK reactor from above and unloaded from the top of the core. This fact served as one of the grounds for not recognizing it as an invention after 1973, since the authors of the 1967 application tried to base their claim on a facility already in place with features they had not proposed. It turned out in the course of operation that the core of the RBMK reactor, which at first was monocritical, became polycritical, that is, there were several independent critical zones of small size. That is why questions and problems related to its safe operation were arising all the time. They have remained on the agenda up to this time. For example, in December 1979 the journal *ATOMNAYA ENERGIYA* reported a branch seminar on these matters. Some 18 organizations took part in it. It follows from S. Ushanov's article in *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* on 20 July 1988, which was entitled "Dissenters Needed," that the shortcomings of the RBMK reactor were known to the physicists of the IAE imeni I. V. Kurchatov back in 1965. But they did not correct them over a period of more than 20 years.

Four years after the application was submitted, A. P. Aleksandrov, member of the Academy, announced a plan for broad and priority application of the untested RBMK reactors. Under the 5-yr plan (1971-1975) two-thirds of the capacity of AES were envisaged with these dangerous reactors.

...A Vulnerable Safety

[Belyayev] *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* readers and I are interested in the following circumstance. How could this clearly dangerous invention be imposed upon the Fatherland? Explain the mechanism whereby A. P. Aleksandrov, member of the Academy, managed to do this. Who was so persistent and clever as to succeed in

imposing on the 9th FYP application of the RBMK reactor which still had not been tested and, as it turned out, contained a sinister defect?

[Bobrov] Thanks to unscrupulous promotion, the key officials of Minsredmash and the USSR State Committee for Use of Atomic Energy, whose interests were expressed by A. Aleksandrov, member of the Academy, managed to achieve wide application of the RBMK in the 9th through the 11th FYPs. The high world prices of petroleum and gas at the time also played their role. In relating plans for application of the RBMK reactor to the world energy crisis, A. Aleksandrov wrote: "The trend towards higher petroleum and gas prices ... will undoubtedly be stable. This will gradually bring about a radical change in the structure of consumption of energy resources to the advantage of nuclear power." The member of the Academy was wrong. The drop of world petroleum and gas prices and the utter feebleness of the physicists of the AES imeni I. V. Kurchatov in the field of invention indicate the opposite.

[Belyayev] At the time you are talking about did any of the leading physical scientists in the USSR Academy of Sciences or in institutions concerned with the practical side speak in favor of developing domestic nuclear power on a sound scientific basis that would preclude a disaster like Chernobyl? Perhaps there were voices of those who in the end called for attention to be paid to something, who called for a different strategy, or were those voices drowned in the chorus of those who preferred to praise the "outstanding achievements" of the "imaginative" people who held the key positions in the USSR Academy of Sciences and in the IAE imeni I. V. Kurchatov?

[Bobrov] Yes, there was opposition, but it was not enough. I repeat—the FEI and the chief designer's enterprise issued negative conclusions concerning this reactor. In 1967 advocates of the RBMK were opposed by a group of scientists and designers headed by M. D. Millionshchikov, member of the academy, who proposed a high-temperature uranium-graphite gas-cooled reactor for double-loop nuclear power plants. Other alternatives were also proposed. But beginning in 1967, under the pretext of "concentrating personnel and resources along the main promising lines," A. P. Aleksandrov, member of the Academy, tried "to completely eliminate from practice the departmental 'property rights' that still exist in the field of science and to eliminate competition of departmental scientific organizations, which results in a squandering of resources."

[Belyayev] The impression is created, in readers of *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* at least, that further operation of the RBMK reactor is a source of danger to human life?

[Bobrov] The most serious steps are now being taken to greatly increase the level of operating safety of the RBMK reactors already in place. Belyayev: I did not put

the question to you by accident. In the opinion of A. D. Sakharov, member of the Academy, "humanity needs nuclear power, but it must be safe.... Underground placement of nuclear reactors is the radical solution." He therefore proposes adoption of an international law that would prohibit locating nuclear reactors on the surface.

[Bobrov] There is also another logical way to put it—AESs must be built far from large cities and bodies of water.

[Belyayev] We should not suppose that AESs are being built only in the Soviet Union. They have already become predominant in France (70 percent), and they have been playing an exceedingly important role in the United States (23 percent). Even in a country like Switzerland, where there is a heightened interest in a clean environment, AESs comprise more than 30 percent of all power plants. Which means that in building and operating AESs the principal attention must be paid to guaranteeing safety and to their environmental cleanness.

So, the benefit from the AES is obvious, as confirmed by world experience. But the problems of their safe operation, and also those of environmental cleanliness, remain the main requirements that have to be met by nuclear power. The Chernobyl tragedy raised the problem in precisely those terms. It seems that there are already changes for the better in meeting these requirements.

Twenty Years of Marking Time

[Belyayev] Please explain why USSR Minsredmash was issuing author's certificates on the inventions of its own organizations and enterprises?

[Bobrov] USSR Minsredmash had the right granted it under Point 79 of the "Regulation on Discoveries, Inventions and Efficiency Proposals" to rule on secret inventions.

[Belyayev] Consequently, the curtain of secrecy reliably concealed all kinds of things. Even competitiveness between proposals of interested scientists, and indeed the very outcome of the struggle over the correctness of the direction to be chosen in the development of science—here I am thinking of nuclear physics.... You were never aware, when you were still working in USSR Minsredmash, of anyone who also was opposing the RBMK, someone who did not want us to experience the disaster that occurred in April 1986?

[Bobrov] The advocates of broad application of the RBMK bypassed the expert evaluation of patents on invention—which was a kind of state acceptance of scientific-research and development projects. V. A. Legasov, member of the Academy, upon retiring from active life, named the types of nuclear reactors that were alternative to the RBMK: the VVER, the VTGR, etc. But they cannot be considered fundamentally and qualitatively new. He probably did not know that back in

1968 a competitor of the RBMK was not recognized as an invention either (IAE application dated 30 November 1967, which was a CO₂-cooled high-temperature uranium-graphite reactor. Its main feature—the coating of its graphite blocks with silicon carbide—was copied from a similar English reactor, the AGR. The authors of the application were M. D. Millionshchikov, member of the Academy, and N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, who recently became a member of the Academy, and others.

[Belyayev] And now twenty years later, in 1988, N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, newly elected member of the Academy, is militating for the West-German version of the helium-cooled high-temperature uranium-graphite reactor, the VTGR. I learned this from a nonsecret publication. And A. N. Protsenko, new chairman of the USSR State Committee for Use of Atomic Energy, is calling upon Gosplan, USSR Minfin, and the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Science and Technology to furnish the foreign exchange to build such a reactor, which has already become obsolete.

[Bobrov] You are right. Under the scientific direction of N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, member of the Academy, and A. N. Protsenko, they have been copying the VTGR-400 reactor with its cast spherical fuel elements from the HTGR, the West-German reactor type. An experimental reactor of this type, the AVR, with a power capacity of 15 megawatts, began to be built in West Germany in 1959. In 1966 it reached criticality, and in 1968 it was brought up to full capacity. In 1972 the American firm Gulf General Atomic bought the license for such a reactor in West Germany, but it did not undertake to build it. A total of 50 of our 55 ministries refused to take part in building the VTRG reactor. A. N. Protsenko wrote about this in PRAVDA. Having failed to create for the AES his own alternative, cheap, up-to-date, efficient and safe version of a nuclear power reactor, N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, member of the Academy and specialists at the AES, actually proposed in NOVYY MIR (Number 9, 1968) that it be built...to the writer A. Adamovich and the journalists S. Ushanov and V. Kurkin. Assuming the writers and journalists had no qualms about it, they might have obtained a patent in the USSR for this "supermodern" alternative on cooperative principles.

Who Stood To Gain?

[Belyayev] Another question: How did everything that happened affect the competition with foreign scientists? After all, the Americans were carefully following what was happening in our nuclear power industry, and they certainly arrived at quite definite conclusions. To be specific, they certainly had something to gain in their own way from our plans for broad introduction of the RBMK reactors, which were not up-to-date and which were essentially defective.

[Bobrov] They undoubtedly stood to gain. I would mention that on 21 June 1973 the U.S. concluded an agreement with us on scientific-technical cooperation in the field of peaceful use of atomic energy and on conducting joint projects with fast-neutron reactors—breeders. It took effect in spite of complications in American-Soviet relations. On 31 May 1988 it was extended during the visit to Moscow of U.S. President R. Reagan.

[Belyayev] Do you think that what happened was the beginning of what ultimately, after 1973, laid the foundation for defective and knowingly erroneous estimates of our "successes" in everything related to the production of reactors for the nuclear power industry and to that direction in nuclear physics? It seems worthwhile here to touch on certain external aspects of what happened, their connection with the 1973 and 1988 agreements between the USSR and the United States.

[Bobrov] When they concluded the 1973 agreement, the Americans knew from the early publications, speeches and articles of A. Aleksandrov, member of the Academy, that the nuclear chain reactions of neutron fission of uranium-235 (plutonium-239), which had been known since 1939-1940, were being established as the basis of Soviet nuclear power, that is, the uranium-plutonium field cycle was being established. By 1973 they had invented a method of achieving controllable and self-sustaining neutron fission chain reactions of uranium-238 and thorium-232 by means of prior acceleration of their nuclei in a critical volume. This method made it possible to cease or substantially reduce the mining of natural uranium and to sharply reduce the volume of separation of its isotopes and the volume of radiochemical processing of the irradiated nuclear fuel. Uranium-238 had been mined more than a hundred years before in the USSR and the United States, as confirmed by the data of A. Aleksandrov.

It was this invention that made it possible for the Americans to create the x-ray, gamma ray and neutron weapons with nuclear-pumped guided energy transmission (ONPE) and photon nuclear rocket engines. The fundamental physical nature of the American "technological breakaway" from the USSR in the field of nuclear physics and nuclear power both on the ground and in space lies in the acceleration in critical volume of the fissioning nuclei of uranium-235, uranium-238, plutonium-239, thorium-232 and uranium-233.

[Belyayev] Which means that you believe that the gap has become reality?

[Bobrov] Yes, what is more, this gap, it is thought in the United States, became possible thanks to the 1973 reassessment of the program for development of American nuclear power by the Bethe Commission. That marked the beginning of secret projects in the United States to create a qualitatively new nuclear energy technology—the material basis of the SDI program. It has to be said that the misleading conclusions of that commission were

accepted by A. P. Aleksandrov as concurrence in his outdated judgements concerning the breeder reactor. That is why he erroneously declared to be defective an approach to the use of uranium resources which had proven to be more economical and promising in the United States; as he put it, it had never fitted in to the doubling times of the new nuclear fuel—plutonium-239. The member of the Academy considered the "achievements of the nuclear power sector of the electric power industry" using the RBMK and the more costly uranium-plutonium fuel cycle in the USSR the "first and simplest step" forward. The 21 June 1973 agreement with us made it possible for the Americans on the one hand to reliably observe and even control the size of our lag in these vitally important fields and on the other to secretly carry out their own "balanced technology initiative" (STI), of which the SDI program is a part.

By extending the 1973 agreement on 31 May 1988, the Americans were pursuing the same objective. They assumed that even after the Chernobyl disaster the development of Soviet nuclear power would be oriented as before towards the uranium-plutonium fuel cycle, towards the obsolete VVER and VPPR reactor types, towards our outdated conception of the "Tokamak" thermonuclear reactor, which requires the use of superconductors and is in my view fruitless.

The New Thing Is the Old Thing That Had Been Forgotten

[Belyayev] Thus the United States of America did not simply count on the technological breakaway from the Soviet Union, it even concealed its desire to achieve its objective with talks about cooperation and with noble gestures. Now it is interested in widening the size of that gap. And it wants to be confident that our science, our nuclear physicists, will continue to take the wrong road.

[Bobrov] Having followed American publications, I have a general idea about the design of the nuclear-pumped Star-Wars weapon, and I can imagine the physical principles on which it operates. Unfortunately, some of our narrow specialists and entire departments—monopolists in their respective fields—are at present not very interested in this. Beginning with the first designs of the antimissile defense system (PRO) and up to the present time American military specialists have considered nuclear warheads installed on antimissile missiles to be the main realistic means of destroying the enemy's nuclear warheads. Explorations for new means of destruction led them in the 60s and 70s to the idea of creating so called "spectral" nuclear weapons. When such a weapon explodes, it is supposed to give off a large portion of its energy in the form of guided broad-spectrum x-rays. The Americans call the nuclear weapon with guided energy transmission (ONPE) the "nuclear-pumped x-ray laser."

[Belyayev] What do you think, why have they done this?

[Bobrov] In order to conceal the direction of research and development in this field with deliberate misinformation about the coherent character of this device's x-ray emission. The original source of this misinformation was the Livermore National Laboratory (in California, USA). In 1981 a series of knowingly false reports were published to the effect that during a nuclear test a single-action x-ray "laser" supposedly generated beams of coherent x-ray emission with a wave length of 14 angstroms.

In 1986 this fiction migrated into the book *Kosmicheskoye Oruzhiye: dilemma bezopasnosti* (Space Weapons: The Arms Control Dilemma). In 1987 it was repeated in our journal *ATOMNAYA TEKHNIKA ZA RUBEZHOM*. These sources also emphasized the single-action operation of the nuclear-pumped x-ray laser.

But it turned out that the fundamental operating principle of this weapon, which the Americans have called the nuclear-pumped x-ray "laser," has long been known. It was explained back in his time by L. A. Artsimovich, who wrote that a high-temperature plasma, like an absolutely black body, can have a broad spectrum.

[Belyayev] What is the power of this laser device?

[Bobrov] Depending on the required radii and threshold of excitation and also on the angle of divergence of the guided emission of the plasma laser, the power of the mini nuclear explosion to pump it must be between 1000 and 2000 kilograms of TNT for one shot. Its firing rate could be at least 100 shots per second. U.S. military experts have calculated that the energy stores of a space-based laser device would be altogether sufficient to produce about 10,000 ignition sites on various facilities on the surface of the earth.

[Belyayev] As far as I am aware, doubts have been expressed: Will those 10,000 earth shots be achieved? I would like to know where such a laser has been built and exactly what objective it was invented for by those who are proud today of such an invention?

[Bobrov] The idea of a plasma "spectral" nuclear warhead occurred first of all in the head of Edward Teller, the father of the American hydrogen bomb, one of the founders and the honorary vice-president of Livermore National Laboratory (LNL). The point is that the principles of the thermonuclear magnetic trap such as "Astron," which was developed at LNL over the period 1961-1969, and its subsequent modifications, are used in the nuclear-pumped x-ray plasma "laser." But those principles could not have been implemented without using the technical solutions known to me from the descriptions accompanying Soviet inventions. U.S. patent number 4151438, applied for there on 17 August 1977 and published 24 April 1979, reiterated two of my inventions in the period 1959-1970. This fact helped in ascertaining who other creators of the nuclear pumped plasma laser were.

U.S. patent number 4151438 was issued to the U.S. Department of Energy.

Two staff members of the Sunnyvale Firm "Razor Associates" (Sunnyvale, California)—a subsidiary of the General Electric Corporation, whose names were given by Yu. Zhukov in PRAVDA, were indicated as the authors of the invention. This key invention was tested in the United States in the period 1977-1979 and turned out to be very effective. In 1978 and over the period up to 1987 it was taken into account in correcting the program to develop the plasma laser, which was adopted in 1974 for completion in 1990 and has been camouflaged under the program of projects to develop highly efficient thermionic converters (TEP) of nuclear (thermal) energy to electric power. From 1979 to 1983 work in the field of SDI and thermionic converters continued intensively, but information has not been published on this in the United States.

SDI Is Continuing!

[Belyayev] I remember that on 23 March 1983 U.S. President R. Reagan officially announced the SDI program, for which the Bethe Commission had given the lead in 1973. In 1984 the misleading SR-100 program was adopted in the United States to develop space-based nuclear power plants.

[Bobrov] It is curious that the small-size and lightweight nuclear pumped plasma lasers have been built and are being built through the efforts of several organizations under control of the U.S. Government to reliably hit an enemy's nuclear warheads and to destroy the strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons in flight or at airfields, directly over the enemy's territory.

But in order to conceal the pathways by which the plasma lasers were being created, in October 1987 the Americans announced in Moscow the cessation of all work on the program for the overt thermonuclear magnetic trap, which covered "Astron," referred to above. At the same time they gained an opportunity to observe such efforts in the USSR. This was reported by the journal *ATOMNAYA ENERGIYA* concerning the 1988 extension of the Soviet-American agreement dated 21 June 1973.

[Belyayev] What do you think about the tasks of the newly created "USSR Nuclear Society"?

[Bobrov] Those tasks can be judged only from the statement made by N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, member of the Academy and a member of its organizing committee. In his opinion, a need has arisen in our country to step up measures to protect against potentially dangerous sources of nuclear energy, even if this detracts from their energy performance. He also saw "human lack of sophistication and ignorance" as a potential danger. Against the background of what has now become the post-Chernobyl decline, the danger of SDI and its

nuclear technology would seem not to exist. That is why this interview with you, one might assume, will help, to borrow the words of the academician, to "raise the general level of knowledge in this field, so that the people themselves can make a competent and responsible judgement about what has happened."

[Belyayev] In one of his campaign speeches newly elected President G. Bush, speaking at the American Legion Convention, said that he had seen with his own eyes the SDI technology—"the result of American inventiveness and scientific genius..."

On 9 November 1988 the TASS correspondent in New York reported plans to launch into earth orbit on 27 April 1989 an experimental American satellite with a particle-beam weapon on board intended to intercept ballistic missiles with a stream of neutral particles.

The term "neutral particles" does not say very much to uninformed people. For the informed, by contrast, mention of it is a danger signal. The point is that a stream of neutral particles—neutrons—could cause a nuclear explosion. So, the discussions about SDI are taking on quite specific outlines.

[Belyayev] One more question in conclusion—about your personal fate, Viktor Aleksandrovich?

[Bobrov] Everything seems rather strange. I have been discharged, say the top officials of TSNIIatominform, but there is no entry on being discharged in my work book. The reason is that there has been no discharge order. As far as my inventions are concerned, the issue of applying them, I have been informed by someone on the staff of the CPSU Central Committee, was placed before the leadership of USSR Minsredmash back in 1986. They turned it over to the head organizations for consideration. So far there has been no response concerning the results of that examination.

[Belyayev] I suppose that our article will promote comprehensive analysis and open discussion of the problems covered. I predict in advance that some judgements will arouse discussion. It was in fact written in order to discover the true state of affairs concerning the problems covered.

Foreign Policy Aspect of Defense Policy
18010672 Moscow KOMMUNIST
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[Article by I. Kulkov]

[Text] About the author: Ivan Ivanovich Kulkov was a participant of the Great Patriotic War. He graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He worked in the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee and in the Higher Party School. He is presently working in a scientific research

institution. He is the author of several books and pamphlets, and of numerous works on international and military political subjects; he is a candidate of economic sciences and a docent.

There are conclusions and admissions which are difficult to make but without which it would be impossible to move forward. In the mid-1980s, the Soviet state's internal development reached a dangerous line of economic stagnation and near-crisis in the national economy. Politics were dominated by bureaucratic and dictatorial methods of the society's leadership, the principles of democracy were being violated, and glasnost was not working. And this was at a time in which the international situation remained dangerous and contradictory. The arms race unleashed by imperialism attained unprecedented heights. The USA and NATO were openly aggressive in relation to the socialist fraternity.

Sober scientific analysis, political wisdom and boldness were what was required of the Communist Party in its assessment of the situation under these conditions. The new leadership of the CPSU honestly and openly admitted to the flaws of the period of stagnation, and began restructuring all spheres of the life of Soviet society. The April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference became turning points in the history of the USSR. Restructuring began within the country, in its foreign and defense policy, and in the USSR Armed Forces. And this was to be expected, since the foreign policy and defense functions of the Soviet state are in many ways interdependent and closely coupled.

Had Mistakes Been Made?

Restructuring. This word has now entered the political lexicon of many countries. And restructuring itself has become a factor of international significance. In the words of U.S. Senator (Dem) Thomas Harkin, "it is also encouraging Americans to take a look at themselves and determine their immediate objectives.... Restructuring is a life-giving process for the USA and the peoples of other countries as well."

The CPSU organically associates the course of restructuring the internal life of Soviet society with transformations in both foreign political and military relations with all developed countries of the capitalist system. And chiefly with the USA, with which we have the most complex relations.

The party admitted that the most important foreign policy decisions had often been made in our country by a small circle of people, without collective and comprehensive discussion and analysis. Nor had the CPSU always sought advice openly from communist parties of other socialist countries. As a result the reactions to international events and to the policy of other states were hardly uniform. The time has now come to regret the fact

that our supreme leadership had not always carefully weighed and correctly assessed what a particular military step in the international arena might have as its result, and what its cost to the Soviet people might be.

The Soviet Union became the first to oppose and persistently fight the threat of nuclear war hanging over mankind, and it is still waging this fight. However, it has not always been consistent and logical in its foreign policy activities. New possibilities for reducing international tension and attaining greater mutual understanding between countries and peoples were not fully realized. While they discussed the enormous threat hanging over the world as a result of accumulation of nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race, former political and military leaders of the USSR and prominent social scientists still did not exclude the possibility of victory in nuclear war, feeling that it would lead only to the demise of the capitalist system, and not of the whole human race.

As a consequence we observed confrontational approaches to nonconfrontational situations, and a military-political response in place of a purely political one. Responding to the nuclear challenge made by capitalist states against the USSR and all socialist countries, and concentrating enormous resources and attention on the military aspect of opposing imperialism, it was said at the 19th party conference, we have not always utilized political possibilities for ensuring the state's security and for reducing tension between nations—possibilities which became available in connection with fundamental changes occurring in the world. And as a result of this, we allowed ourselves to be drawn into an arms race, which could not but have an effect on the country's socioeconomic development and on its international position.

In the 1970s and early 1980s the USSR made "knee-jerk" responses to the arms race initiated in the West. In response to the appearance of certain new armament systems in the West, and chiefly in the USA, we began the effort of creating similar systems on the spot. We were of course compelled to do so. But obviously the search for political means and the effort to turn the world public to our side had not been pursued to the end.

Time sorts everything out. It is now clear that in foreign policy, the role of Western European countries in world affairs was underestimated, and adequate attention was not devoted to states of other regions—Asian and Latin American for example. Proposals made at the highest level were not always promptly materialized as specific diplomatic actions. In its fight for peace the USSR became carried away with debate and discussions, and therefore it often found itself under the control of some Western officials who were ready to deliberately conduct endless debates. We also clearly underestimated another substantial factor in international relations—popular diplomacy, communication with the public.

On the whole, of course, the basic line of Soviet foreign policy kept to the general direction developed and proclaimed by V. I. Lenin, a course toward ensuring peace and strengthening the security of both the Soviet Union and all mankind. But the mistakes and miscalculations noted above resulted in the fact that our numerous peace initiatives did not produce the positive results for which they were intended, and the military threat steadily increased.

Under these conditions the CPSU raised the issue of not simply improving but renewing all of the country's foreign and defense policy. As in the case of domestic policy, the CPSU turned to Leninist methodology of analyzing social phenomena in its first efforts to restructure foreign policy on the basis of a new way of political thinking. And primarily to the experience of acting in all situations from the positions of realism, and on the basis of the mutual relationship existing between foreign and domestic policy.

Do the Strong Need Force?

Interpreting and analyzing the realities of the modern world, the CPSU developed a new way of political thinking. The party based itself on the idea that all contradictions and differences between the interests of peoples and states exist in an increasingly more integral and interrelated world. As it developed its foreign political and military strategy in the era of restructuring, the CPSU began paying attention not to the traditional accounting of the balance of forces but a politically new position—accounting for the interests of the sides. Approaches and aspirations which required solution of disputed issues by military means were completely excluded.

"...Force and the threat of force," declared M. S. Gorbachev in a speech to the United Nations, "cannot and should not be an instrument of foreign policy. This pertains first of all to nuclear weapons, but matters go beyond them as well. Self-restraint and complete exclusion of the use of force outside one's country are required of all, and chiefly of the stronger." This position represents the first and most important component of the ideal of a nonviolent world.

The party came to the conclusion that the values of mankind in general must prevail over class values. Survival of mankind was determined as the principal and priority objective of foreign and defense policy. A program of gradual elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, implementation of the ideas of establishing universal security and an "all-European house," restructuring of relations in the Asian-Pacific region, the conception of sufficient defense, of nonaggressive defense, arms reduction, resolution of regional conflicts, withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, international economic and ecological security, and inclusion of science in world policy became the most important components of this policy.

Thus the task is to fully implement the principle of peaceful coexistence as the highest universal principle of international relations. But the USSR has rejected viewing this principle as a special form of class struggle. Because peaceful coexistence is based on the principles of nonaggression, respect of sovereignty and national independence, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, and freedom of choice of the paths of political and socioeconomic development. Our basis for action today is that freedom of choice is a universal principle, and there must be no exceptions to it. The USSR also favors deideologization of international relations, which presupposes rejection of any attempt to carry over the ideological struggle to mutual relations between states.

In the modern era the struggle between the two opposing systems is not the dominant trend of world development. This is true because priority is now placed on common human values, on the interests of social progress, and on the struggle for survival of human civilization.

When it began restructuring foreign and defense policy, the Communist Party and the government based themselves on interrelationships between the domestic and the foreign policy course. Foreign policy is in fact a continuation of domestic policy. This is why it has been made our objective to make defense policy more profitable, if I may be permitted to use that term—that is, to ensure the USSR's defense capabilities in the conditions of economic reform through the lowest financial and material outlays.

It was emphasized at the 19th party conference that the effectiveness of our defense construction must be ensured from this day forward predominantly by qualitative parameters in relation to both technology and military science on one hand and the composition of the armed forces on the other. It is important for restructuring of defense policy to proceed in such a way as not to allow the USSR to be drawn into new rounds of the arms race. As was noted earlier, this has a negative effect on the country's socioeconomic development and on its international position.

And this is the way we are proceeding. Restructuring its defense policy in particular, the Soviet Union rejected "knee-jerk" response to the West in the production of the latest types of arms. Despite attempts by Western propaganda to show that "the Russians have overtaken" the USA in space-based arms and created their own antiballistic missile defense system, the USSR has declared on several occasions at the most authoritative level that there is no such thing as a Soviet SDI program. Since it declared a moratorium on all testing of antisatellite systems in 1985, the USSR has not created any space weapons. The only thing that the USSR has and maintains is the one antiballistic missile complex around Moscow, which is strictly in keeping with the letter of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Another highly important aspect of restructuring of defense policy is that the Soviet Union will maintain its defense capability at a level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency, and this was once again announced in the United Nations. This means that our country will invariably observe military equilibrium and strategic parity between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO; it will maintain a potential necessary only for guaranteed repulsion of aggression and excluding the possibility of surprise and major offensive operations. The balance of forces between the two sides must be determined not by the principle of who possesses more armament, but by the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense. This is what is to ensure strategic stability in our complex and contradictory world.

Are There Borders to Glasnost?

Historical experience confirms that without the participation of prominent scholars of international relations and other specialists, without regard for public opinion, and without glasnost in general, an extremely small circle of people, even if they are of a very authoritative rank, would hardly be able to ensure adoption of optimum foreign policy decisions. We are compelled to speak about this today in connection with Afghanistan. In the conditions of restructuring, our leadership came to the conclusion that the Afghan regional knot will not be untangled by military means. And so a course toward political solution of the problem was adopted. As was foreseen by the Geneva Accords, the last Soviet soldier left the territory of Afghanistan on 15 February. We kept our political word.

The Soviet people must know the price of the security of their state, and the possibilities for reducing this price by utilizing political means more extensively. In the conditions of economic reform, in which every kopeck is being accounted for, it is correct to place priority on political solutions from an economic standpoint as well.

Restructuring defense policy, the Soviet state is employing glasnost not only inside the country but also in the international arena. We openly declare our goals addressing both the governments and the peoples of the world. Thus, speaking at the UN General Assembly's Third Special Session on Disarmament, E. A. Shevardnadze noted that glasnost is one, that it stretches beyond state borders. For the first time from the podium of the United Nations a Soviet representative communicated information on strategic offensive arms, on the number of units of delivery vehicles and on the total number of warheads they carry, including those installed in sea-based cruise missiles.

The USSR Ministry of Defense is actively participating in the development of the foreign policy aspect of the defense policy of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. The highest military leaders and experts took a most direct part in summit talks from Geneva to Moscow. The leadership of the USSR Armed Forces is also involved in

the efforts to organize fulfillment of the INF Treaty, to prepare materials concerned with limiting and reducing arms and armed forces, to establish monitoring and to solve other complex problems.

It was difficult to imagine just 2-3 years ago that the U.S. secretary of defense would meet not just once but as many as three times in 1988 with the USSR defense minister. The chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces visited the USA. He was received in the Pentagon, he attended military exercises, and he visited the aircraft carrier "Theodore Roosevelt." An American representative—the chairman of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces—will visit the USSR in 1989. Other meetings between the highest Soviet and American military leaders have been planned as well.

All of this is helping us to find the balance of interests and is providing a possibility for taking the first real step forward on the road to nuclear disarmament, and to prepare the conditions for further constructive negotiations and positive solutions. This has demonstrated the great value of dialogue, and the possibility for solving complex international problems by political and not by military means.

The new approach of the Soviet leadership to the foreign policy aspect of defense policy has especially important significance to the success of restructuring within the country and to ensuring Soviet and international security. Moreover it is viewed not as the sum of new principles and views, but as a philosophy of action. A confirmation of this is the Soviet proposals for unilateral reduction of troops and arms in Europe, the USSR's announcement at the Paris conference on chemical weapons that it intends to destroy chemical weapons at a facility specially prepared for this purpose by as early as 1989, and publication of comparative data on the strength of the armed forces and armament of Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.

The idea of a new way of political thinking and the all-embracing system of international security were expressed in the 1986 New Delhi Declaration. It proclaimed the principles of creating a nuclear-free and nonviolent world.

New Approaches

The INF Treaty between the USA and the USSR has become a confirmation of the vitality of the program for a nonviolent and nuclear-free world and for an all-embracing system of international security, and a refutation of some Western officials who accused this program of being utopian. This was the first most important step toward a nuclear-free world.

The signing of the INF Treaty demonstrated not only the possibility that a world without nuclear arms could be created but also the success of restructuring of Soviet defense policy and the effectiveness of its new

approaches. Because rather than attempting to tie together all of its proposals into a single package, as had happened in the past, in Washington the Soviet side proposed removing medium-range missiles from the overall package and signing a separate treaty in relation to them—independently from resolving the issue of strategic defensive weapons and space arms, including SDI.

The treaty is being implemented—missiles are being destroyed—in normal fashion, in a trusting and business-like atmosphere. All of this provided the Soviet leader the basis for announcing in the United Nations that a new historical reality is arising before our eyes in our country—a turn from the principle of possessing more arms than the other side to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense. Moreover, preconditions were created for the next step forward toward a nuclear-free world—for the signing of a treaty to reduce strategic offensive arms in the conditions of strict compliance with the ABM Treaty (1972), and to observe it for an agreed period. Next in line are prohibition of nuclear testing and the signing of a universal convention on prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

Clear confirmation of the effectiveness of the new realistic approaches to solving complex problems can be found in the successful conclusion to the Vienna meeting (January 1981) of representatives of states in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The mandate it created for negotiations by 23 states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals foresees attainment of stability at a lower level of armed forces and arms, and elimination of the potential for a surprise attack and for large-scale offensive actions.

The Soviet Union attaches important significance to raising the authority, role and effectiveness of the United Nations in the matter of maintaining peace on the planet. Our country is doing everything it can to promote reinforcement of the role of this universal international organization, and it is influencing renewal of world policy through it. In addition to conducting UN operations in a region in which conflicts already exist, the USSR feels it possible to use the United Nations to prevent conflicts in their early stages. We are prepared to participate in formation of a system to train personnel for service in UN troops on a mutual basis with other countries. The Soviet Union is prepared to examine the issue of allocating its own military contingent for UN operations in support of peace, and to participate in material and technical supply of UN forces.

A decision announced at the United Nations by the Soviet government on unilateral reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe was a great practical contribution to the turn from "more arms" to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense, and to construction of the all-European house. In 2 years (1989-1990) their strength will be reduced by 500,000 men and by 10,000

tanks and other armament. Six tank divisions are being withdrawn from the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary or disbanded. Among the groups of Soviet forces in these countries, assault landing and a number of other formations and units will also be withdrawn, including assault bridging units together with their armament and combat equipment. A clearly defensive structure will be imparted to the remaining divisions. This will be the result of removing a large number of tanks from them.

Moreover the USSR's military budget will be reduced by 14.2 percent. Production of armament and military equipment will be reduced by 19.5 percent. All of this is evidence that the Soviet Union is not only making concrete proposals on arms reduction, but is also filling its military doctrine with practical content, making it truly defensive. The Soviet initiatives are supported by other countries of the Warsaw Pact. They also decided on unilateral reduction of their armed forces and reduction of defense expenditures.

Pursuing a policy of glasnost and criticizing the shortcomings of the past, the leadership of the USSR openly admitted that for a long time the Soviet side had a negative attitude toward certain verification measures. They, and especially the on-site inspections the USA aspired to, were interpreted by us solely as legalization of espionage. This did not promote attainment of agreement, and provided the grounds for anti-Soviet propaganda. Life demanded new approaches, a new way of political thinking in the area of verification of disarmament as well.

Who would have thought 3 years ago that foreign specialists would be admitted to the USSR's test ranges, military bases and plants? The same goes equally for the USA. Moscow and Washington took such a step voluntarily, recognizing that it would be in their national interests to "reveal" their military secrets.

One of the priority tasks in the foreign policy sphere of the defense of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries is a course toward complete and universal prohibition of nuclear testing. We are realists. We do not stand on maximalist positions today—all or nothing. The most reasonable and possible path is to solve this highly important problem stage by stage.

The peace-loving initiatives we are offering today in the foreign policy sphere of defense policy (not in the manner of former times) are being materialized rather

quickly as specific acts and diplomatic actions. In February 1987, at the international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for Survival of Mankind," we returned to the old idea of eliminating foreign bases on foreign territories.

A little more than a year has passed since then, and as early as at the UN General Assembly's Third Special Session on Disarmament (June 1988) the USSR proposed an elaborate program for complete elimination of foreign military presence and military bases on foreign territories by the year 2000. In the opinion of the USSR, this problem needs to be solved gradually, with regard for the specific features and actual needs of security and defense. Although it did not receive universal support at that time, the Soviet proposal still stands.

The "Arctic peace program" declared in fall 1987 by M. S. Gorbachev in Murmansk also stands. Its goal is to make the Arctic a zone of peace and trust through radical reduction of military activity. The Krasnoyarsk initiatives directed at demilitarizing and relaxing tension in the Asia-Pacific region also await their implementation. Once they are implemented, the colossal potential of Asia and of the Pacific and Indian basins, in which more than 3 billion people live, will begin working for the good of general human progress and for creation of a universal system of peace and international security. Implementation of the idea of creating an all-European house has special significance; the results of Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and on measures to strengthen trust and security in Europe have special significance.

Restructuring, the new way of political thinking, and the USSR's struggle for peace and collective security. Today in the West, these are often perceived as synonyms. The French newspaper FIGARO noted that a new situation has evolved in the world. The USSR is no longer perceived by the West as a dangerous state. Many American and other Western newspapers are writing in the same spirit.

Does this mean that the "enemy image" is gradually dissipating in the West? It seems that this is so. Sympathies toward the Soviet people, toward the Soviet government, and trust in its foreign and defense policy are growing.

But the broad and acute struggle between the old and new ways of thinking, and the confrontation between the forces of peace and war, upon the outcome of which the future of the entire planet depends, are far from finished.

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Vienna CFE Talks Termed 'Businesslike'
*AU2905150289 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 27 May 89 p 2*

[Jan Reifenberg article: "Rapprochement at the Vienna Negotiations—Gorbachev Seems To Be in a Hurry"]

[Text] Vienna, 26 May—Whereas the quarrel over short-range missiles seemed to dominate NATO until the beginning of its summit meeting, the Vienna negotiations on conventional stability [CFE] in Europe between the Western alliance and the Warsaw Pact are continuing in a businesslike way without any polemics. On 23 and 25 May, the East presented its new figures on the reduction of forces in the deployment countries outside their home territories. In this respect, it comes closer to the ceilings submitted by NATO for this area in Vienna. The Eastern figures on the forces of deployment are clearly higher than the Western ones. Soviet armored units will continue to be deployed in the contact zones—in the Baltic republics, for instance—and thus be dangerously close to the German border, and precise and necessary figures on the decisive subdivisions of the units that are capable of invasion have not yet been given. However, nobody in Vienna disputes the fact that the Warsaw Pact obviously has a specific interest in results being achieved soon in the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe.

Senior U.S. officials have said that the rate of these talks is "worlds apart from the tenacious dragging along" marking the 14 years of unsuccessful Vienna negotiations on "mutual and balanced force reductions in (central) Europe." Since the CFE talks opened in March, more progress has been made than ever before. The Soviet intention to achieve results is obvious, even though Moscow insists on the demand—made in public statements and not at the negotiating table—that nuclear weapons or naval forces be included, which is unacceptable to the West. Gorbachev, who is pressed by domestic policy and economic problems, is in a hurry. So, some Western delegations believe that it is possible to reach agreement on basic matters before the end of the year. Hungary, the most progressive state of the East bloc, even talks about the possibility that the first phase of the CFE talks could be concluded by 1990.

Rhetoric and Reality

However, as always in arms control negotiations, we must differentiate between statements addressed to the outside world and the real elimination of existing difficulties at the negotiating table. It will now be the task of work groups to tackle the difficult and unresolved structural problems. The most important of which is: defining precisely which of the three main weapons systems—tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers—may remain in the zones of the region between the Atlantic and the Urals after parity has been achieved. Here the

central European section, meaning in particular the two German states, is of decisive importance. In view of the Warsaw Pact's proposals, the definition of what may be kept in rear depots or spare part stores and subject to constant inspection, must be precise and binding. It is necessary to agree on the types of tanks that are covered by the talks, in particular the tanks in the East. The Warsaw Pact so far has only given general figures; the West does not know whether these figures essentially refer to tanks that are becoming obsolete, such as the T 54's or T 55's, or the highly modern T 80's, the turrets of which have a ceramic protection.

The West is in agreement that progress should first be made in the three weapons categories mentioned above which are important in the capability for invasion. The East also wants to include fighter aircraft, helicopters, and troops. NATO continues to be basically ready (with France, which is always concerned about keeping the missiles and warheads of its national nuclear force, maintaining an extremely hesitant attitude) to discuss fighter aircraft at a later time. However, the Soviets also know that given the high mobility of aircraft, this will be very difficult, and inspections can always only be snapshots. In addition, their definition of fighter aircraft and attack aircraft is artificial, and they still exclude thousands of aircraft intended to defend the home country. The West basically insists on the exclusion of nuclear weapons, as stated in the CFE mandate. The West German side believes, however, that agreement on a deadline for a decision on the modernization of short-range weapons could be useful for the continuation of the first phase of the CFE talks.

Elimination of Asymmetries

The important thing is that the collective ceilings presented by the Warsaw Pact in Vienna (after Gorbachev's first information given to U.S. Secretary of State Baker in Moscow) almost correspond to that of the NATO proposal at the beginning of the CFE talks. The concession consists in the fact that the East has a considerable supremacy in certain arms categories and, therefore, existing asymmetries have to be comprehensively reduced before NATO cuts back on its arms.

Those in the West, who attribute all progress to Gorbachev's behavior, have to be repeatedly told: Particularly in Vienna, the East is responding to proposals that NATO made quite some time ago. In this respect, the irritating Soviet claims, that Moscow has not yet heard anything about a NATO counterproposal, are simply wrong. In the Vienna working groups it will have to be shown how the well-sounding proposals are put into practice. In this connection, it is obvious that on the Eastern side Hungary and Poland are most progressive in the negotiations in the Vienna Hofburg Palace, and the GDR and the CSSR are most conservative; the Soviet Union wants peace but, concerning the central zone, it does not oppose the detailed proposals made by East Berlin.

However, the West, too, has difficulties: France, for instance, refuses to include its nuclear weapons in later negotiations, it also categorically refuses inspections of maneuvers of its troops in the FRG. However, it seems that the internal French conflict concerning all issues no longer completely brakes the Vienna talks. On the Western side the CFE is doubtless determined by the United States, Great Britain, and the FRG. The duality between the Soviet chief delegate, the experienced diplomat Grinevskiy, and his military adviser General Tatarnikov, who is subordinate to the ideas or reservations of the Soviet Armed Forces, remains obvious.

Parallel to the CFE negotiations of the 23 members states of the East and West, in the Redoute Hall of the Hofburg Palace the 35 CSCE states are holding negotiations on the expansion of the confidence-building measures decided in Stockholm in 1986, but only the United States and the FRG have independent chief delegates for the two negotiations. This considerably strains the work and time of those who "have their fingers in two pies." There are chief delegates who consider the negotiations on confidence-building measures as the real event in Vienna, because it is a political conference. This interpretation is based on the fact that in Stockholm the optimum of what maneuver ceilings and inspections may yield has already been achieved and that this now only has to be expanded in Vienna.

Naval Forces

In this body the Soviet Union constantly repeats its demand for including the naval forces. Here it can threaten that without their inclusion no consensus can be reached at the conference on confidence-building measures and it uses the pressure of time of the next CSCE follow-up conference, which will take place in Helsinki in 1992. However, Moscow knows very well that the West, under the leadership of the United States, will exclude naval forces because of the fundamental geopolitical difference between naval and land forces, for otherwise Western Europe's security could not be guaranteed even if there were parity in the conventional area. Washington has always insisted on the autonomy of the CFE negotiations: Its NATO partners share this opinion, but some of them do see parallels to the topics discussed at the conference on confidence-building measures, because the security interests of the neutral and non-aligned states, for instance, cannot be pressed into molds that are determined by the two superpowers alone.

Bush Troop Announcement Reports Said 'Hot Air'
AU2705150689 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 27 May 89 p 1

[Editorial by "ME": "Blackmail Not Intended"]

[Text] It would be easy, but it would certainly be wrong to combine two newspaper reports from the United States and interpret them as the President's resolve to bring pressure to bear on the federal chancellor to give in

on the missile issue. To be sure, Bush did not say no when asked by a foreign correspondent whether he was interested on principle in visiting the GDR, and last week he probably discussed with his treasury secretary, his state secretary, and the chief of the joint chiefs of staff, the number of troops in Europe. However, we would underestimate the seriousness of the U.S. foreign and alliance policy if we were to insinuate that the leading power of the Western alliance would force the Federal Government in Bonn in a heavy-handed way—10-percent troop withdrawal and a visit to Honecker—to give up its position on the quarrel over short-range missiles.

So far, no solid plans for a substantial unilateral troop withdrawal from Europe can be recognized—apart from considerations regarding "unemployed" personnel of the scrapped intermediate-range missiles, and considerations regarding opportunities to cut spending. That does not have to do with the fact that nothing would jeopardize the Vienna negotiations—the chances and rate of which have improved—on a reduction in conventional weapons in East and West more than such fantastic ideas. By the same token, the successful policy of the United States to encourage Honecker to behave well by holding out the vague prospect of an invitation to visit the United States, would be ruined by an announcement to pay him a visit.

Thus, viewed separately and jointly, both newspaper reports contain a lot of hot air. On the other hand, the undiminished quarrel within the alliance—in particular, with the FRG Government—over the missiles is hot air. Next week, the partners will try to expand and use the narrow leeway for a compromise at a NATO meeting and during visits of the U.S. President to European capitals, including Bonn. Naturally, any compromise subjectively makes all parties involved losers. It may always be possible that objectively, they turn out winners.

Stoltenberg Interviewed on NATO, Third Zero, Deterrence

AU2805155789 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 0900 GMT 28 May 89

[Interview with FRG Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg by Henning Frank; date and place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Frank] Mr Stoltenberg, when you took over the command of the Bundeswehr on 21 April as the 10th defense minister in the FRG's history, you promised that you would in particular be the advocate of the soldiers and their mission. Why did it take almost 5 weeks before this promise was fulfilled last Thursday [25 May] when you visited the troops for the first time?

[Stoltenberg] I have been an attorney of the soldiers and have been responsible for them and their mission from the first day when I took office. My work at Hardthoehe

[FRG Defense Ministry] has been decisively marked by this fact. A number of important decisions had to be made or prepared on the Bundeswehr's mission and the situation of our forces and troops. Prior to my first visit to the troops, I worked extremely hard. I plan to pay seven visits to the troops. By the way, this is nothing new. When it became known on 14 April that I would become defense minister in the framework of the government reshuffle, I had a talk of several hours with Bundeswehr soldiers on their problems in my Rendsburg constituency. I agreed on that visit 6 weeks earlier when I was still finance minister. So my contact with the soldiers was planned on a long-term basis, and this will continue.

[Frank] Given your many international commitments, will you have enough time to sufficiently deal with the concerns and worries of the members of the Bundeswehr?

[Stoltenberg] Indeed, in the first days and weeks, international appointments and commitments took more time than will be the case in the long run. However, you cannot separate such commitments from the specific tasks and worries of the soldiers. I was in London recently. I discussed with my British counterpart Younger the cooperation between German and British soldiers.

[Frank] Including the Rhine Army?

[Stoltenberg] Including the situation and the problems of the Rhine Army, and the positive development in this respect in the FRG. Of course, we also discussed military exercises and the issue of low-altitude flights. That concerns our German Air Force units which like the British pilots must be kept at a high level of defense readiness. I assume that we will be able to ease the strain to a certain extent. I also discussed that with my U.S. counterpart in Washington a week earlier. However, I also state equally clearly that the defense mission of the Bundeswehr and NATO requires low-altitude flight exercises also in the future, even though to a reduced extent.

[Frank] That means that there will be low-altitude flight exercises, but no zero solution.

[Stoltenberg] You can describe it that way, indeed. Those who promise the citizens something different—as some opposition politicians have done—cannot answer convincingly the question about our defense capability. [passage omitted]

[Frank] Let me say a word about the conscripts. How can the considerable scepticism of many conscripts about the Bundeswehr be reduced?

[Stoltenberg] The defense mission and the function of the Bundeswehr and the alliance which protect peace and freedom must be constantly justified. By the way, this is something which we have had to do since the

fifties. In this context, I also expressly welcomed the great speech of our President Richard von Weizsäcker. He rightly stressed this aspect. He said that military service essentially is a war-preventing service. He said that those who make use of their right to decide in favor of civilian substitute service should also consider and respect this. It would be good if the politicians of all democratic parties clearly pointed out the moral bases of military service as a war-preventing service and a military service for peace. In this respect, the agreement that we had with the Social Democrats in the sixties and seventies—I mention the names of Fritz Erler and Helmut Schmidt—regrettably has diminished on the left. It would be good if it increased again, because you cannot pay lip service in favor of the Bundeswehr and at the same time describe low-altitude flight exercises as terror, as has regrettably been done by leading Social Democratic politicians. Here we need a bit more consistency. We also must recognize—and this is my personal belief—that the beginning reforms in the Soviet Union and the East Bloc would not be conceivable without the alliance's and thus our Bundeswehr's 40-year task of ensuring peace and freedom.

[Frank] In other words, without a strong Bundeswehr there is no detente?

[Stoltenberg] That is a valid formula. Leading figures of the Soviet human rights and reform movement—and not some ultraconservative or antiprogressive forces in our Western world—have expressed considerable concern in recent weeks that this reform policy might fail. I recall the speech of Andrey Sakharov—who is certainly the most important personality in the Soviet Union, regarding not only his scientific capacity but also his moral force—the speech he gave in Rome before the Socialist Party of Italy. He said that he wanted the reforms to be successful in the interest of his country. I add that we, too, want them to be successful. But Sakharov added that his doubts whether this goal could be reached were growing. So we must not equate hopes with realities. Because of this fact we continue to need a strong and combat-ready Bundeswehr, also as a visible sign of the FRG's foreign policy significance and in the interest of ensuring peace. [passage omitted]

[Frank] Mr Stoltenberg, is the NATO doctrine of nuclear deterrence not being increasingly called into question as a result of Soviet party-state leader Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals on disarmament and detente, which are very appealing to the public?

[Stoltenberg] According to the unanimous assessment of the coalition parties, the federal chancellor's government statement, and the alliance's joint statement, we continue to need a combination of conventional and nuclear forces in Europe to be able to implement a policy of ensuring peace. As you know, in reality the Soviet Union continues to be immensely superior in conventional forces and in the nuclear sector. This holds doubly true for the European region. Even though we have no reason

to doubt the Soviet Union's interest in disarmament negotiations, it has stepped up armament until recently, including even under Gorbachev. The Soviet Union's immense superiority in land-based short-range missiles has increased. Therefore, we must say that the bases of our security policy continue to be valid, as does the peace-keeping function of nuclear weapons, which has proved its worth in East-West relations for decades. We want to actively push arms control and disarmament negotiations. Vienna represents a really encouraging beginning. We need more energy and more concessions in other areas, in particular on the part of the Soviet Union.

[Frank] Mr Stoltenberg, why does not Bonn clearly reject a third zero solution for short-range nuclear missiles, but instead says no, and then says yes but...?

[Stoltenberg] I think the discussion on this issue is somewhat confusing, and there are misunderstandings and ambiguities. Following long discussions, the coalition parties have defined their position. We work for early negotiations under certain preconditions which must be clarified within the alliance—including the land-based short-range nuclear missiles—and our goal is to reach lower ceilings. Our documents and statements make it entirely clear that the weapons stocks must be reduced. In addition, we want to make a decision on a successor system, a modernized system of the Lance missiles, by 1992. We want to see in the meantime whether the Soviet Union will really have reduced its weapons so drastically, that it will no longer have the capacity to attack or launch large-scale offensives. This is the FRG's position. We have introduced it into the NATO discussions for weeks. We cannot expect every word of the German position to be accepted. However, we of course want our position to be reflected in the final statement at the end of the Atlantic Alliance's opinion-forming process.

[Frank] Mr Stoltenberg, in his government statement on 27 April, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl pointed out that in Bonn's view the alliance should decide in 1992 whether or not a successor system will be required in 1996. Do these two words or not open the door to a third zero solution?

[Stoltenberg] You quoted the government statement correctly. However, it does not make much sense for us in the West or in the Federal Republic to argue the problem on assumptions that we do not know will materialize at all. We stated the expectation very clearly that the Soviet Union will reduce its armaments in a few years to an extent that makes it incapable of launching offensive operations. We should do everything in our power to make it reduce its armaments with the ambitious goal of bringing about a basic change in the military ratio of forces, measured by its present superiority. That seems to me to be more important. However, I should also point out that the alliance, in unanimous statements of all NATO foreign and defense ministers, basically

advocated holding negotiations on a clear reduction in short-range weapons to equal upper ceilings. So the fact that we took up this problem again, could not be a surprise. But we want to reach understanding with the allies, in particular, on the preconditions of such negotiations.

[Frank] Is the quarrel over the missiles between Bonn and Washington not really attributable to the fact that the alliance disagrees on how to effectively counter Gorbachev's charm offensive? Whereas the United States seems to be moderately optimistic about detente, your colleague Hans-Dietrich Genscher already speaks about a change of the tide in East-West relations.

[Stoltenberg] A time of change in the Soviet Union and the East Bloc makes it more difficult to arrive at a joint assessment, than a time of hard confrontation. However, I am convinced that the present changes also offer opportunities, and we must use these opportunities in the interest of Europe, in particular in the interest of the suppressed peoples of East Europe, in the interest of the 17 million Germans who are denied human rights. We must use them politically. I also believe that following intensive discussions within NATO we will also arrive at joint conclusions. However, we must retain our defense capacity. That is very decisive. It is even more important to publicize this idea in the Federal Republic and the Western world, than to allow certain differences on a weapons system to become too large a strain on cooperation within the alliance. I believe that the alliance will be able to solve this problem. It will be able to reach agreement on this issue, too. It has overcome larger difficulties in the past, and it will remain indispensable for a good future, precisely also of Germany, in peace and freedom.

[Frank] Do you also consider this possible, if the overall concept for security, arms control, and disarmament, which has been demanded for a long time, were not to be adopted at the NATO summit tomorrow?

[Stoltenberg] I believe that the summit will reach agreement on the political area—the assessment of foreign policy changes—and on security policy conclusions.

Kohl Repeats Call for Short-Range Missile Cuts
LD2805153589 Hamburg DPA in German 1449 GMT 28 May 89

[Text] Ludwigshafen (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) [Christian Democratic Union] has re-affirmed his call for negotiations on reduction of short-range missiles—parallel to the Vienna negotiations on reduction of conventional arms.

At a European election rally and subsequent press conference on Ludwigshafen on Sunday, Kohl said that negotiations on short-range missiles should be "synchronized" with the negotiations on conventional arms. After the withdrawal of medium-range missiles, negotiations

should now be conducted on intercontinental weapons, chemical weapons should be totally abandoned, and "decisive steps should be undertaken" on conventional weapons. The Vienna negotiations on reduction of conventional arms should "get a move on."

The federal chancellor refused to comment on the Free Democratic Party (FDP) congress resolution on the missile issue. However, he emphasized that Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) had referred to the government statement on the missile issue several times.

Genscher Wins FDP Party Backing on Missile Stance

LD2805103589 Hamburg DPA in German 0906 GMT
28 May 89

[Excerpts] Cologne (DPA)—The liberals [reference to Free Democratic Party (FDP)] have shown their complete support for Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at their party congress on the question of modernizing U.S. short-range missiles. The FDP delegates passed with only one abstention on Sunday, a motion from the party leadership in which negotiations on the dismantling of the type of weapon are described as urgent and in which a third zero-solution is not ruled out.

Genscher emphasized that a community which shares values, such as NATO, which is based on "human dignity, democracy, freedom, and securing peace," should use all opportunities for arms control and disarmament. "No type of weapon should be excluded from disarmament negotiations." This also applies to the nuclear short-range missiles and nuclear artillery.

To great applause from the party congress delegates, Genscher said: "For this reason I can only call out to those who hesitate: Do not be afraid of negotiations; do not be afraid of disarmament. We have much to be afraid of in this world. However, there is one thing we need not fear: negotiations with the aim of creating more security by means of disarmament." The liberals' decision should not cause disquiet to anyone in the government coalition. "The only person who should feel disquiet is the one who wants to depart from what the federal chancellor said in the Bundestag on 27 April."

The foreign minister, who received an ovation lasting several minutes for his speech, gave the assurance that the FDP will "ensure, with the determination we used to push through the treaties with the East, that the historic opportunities in the East-West relationship are used." He added: "Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come." [passage omitted]

Genscher said that his party knows "that Europe's security and stability are unthinkable without the cooperation of the North American democracies." "Europe is our destiny, but Europe is also our opportunity; we have

none other than Europe," he said. "We will not allow ourselves to be pushed into a world of isolation, neutralism, going it alone by anyone."

Defense Minister on NATO Missile Dispute

LD2805095289 Hamburg DPA in German 0743 GMT
28 May 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) [Christian Democratic Union] has called on the West to use politically the "opportunities for change in the USSR." In an interview with Deutschlandfunk, Stoltenberg said on Sunday that even if it is difficult to assess the changes in the Soviet Union and in the East Bloc at the moment, he nevertheless believes that NATO will arrive at a common stand.

NATO's defense capability must remain the priority, Stoltenberg emphasized the day before the NATO summit which opens Monday in Brussels. He expressed his conviction that the alliance will be able to solve the problem of short-range weapons. NATO has overcome greater difficulties in the past. The federal government could not, it is true, expect that "every word of the German position will be adopted," but Bonn intends to regain its place in the opinion-forming process of the Atlantic Alliance, the defense minister stressed.

On the question of the controversial third zero-solution, Stoltenberg stated that it does not make much sense to conduct a great argument in the West and in the Federal Republic over assumptions when you do not know whether they will even come about. Bonn has clearly expressed the expectation that the Soviet Union will have disarmed so much in a few years that it will no longer be capable of attack. In this connection, Stoltenberg spoke of the USSR's "massive superiority" in the conventional and nuclear areas.

On the question of low-flying by U.S. and British pilots over the federal area, Stoltenberg said that there will be a "certain reduction." The minister used the phrase: "No zero-solution, but low-flying practice at a low level."

The interview was prereleased to DPA in an edited form.

SPD's Bahr Cautions on CFE Time Limits

LD2905201589 Hamburg DPA in German 1930 GMT
29 May 89

[Text] Bremen (DPA)—The SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] disarmament expert Egon Bahr has welcomed U.S. President George Bush's disarmament proposals. "Now the whole affair is gaining speed," he said in an interview with the Bremen newspaper WESER-KURIER (Tuesday's edition) [30 May edition]. "But, one must add, these proposals do not solve the open question for NATO of the alliance's readiness for negotiations on the short-range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe."

Bahr expressed surprise at the extent of Bush's proposals. "But I consider it to be dangerous", said the SPD disarmament expert, "to set time limits". The subjects under negotiation are too extensive for there to be results in Vienna within 6 months, particularly since there has as yet been no preliminary work carried out by the negotiating partners in the air force sector. He felt that a realistic forecast would be that of at least a year to reach an agreement on troops, tanks, and artillery, and another year for an agreement on air forces. But it would certainly be too large if negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons are left until after that.

An edited version of the interview was pre-released to DPA.

Government, Press Reactions to Bush NATO Summit Proposal on SNF, CFE

Weizsaecker Praises Compromise

LD3005171889 Hamburg DPA in German 1539 GMT
30 May 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal President Richard von Weizsaecker praised the NATO compromise on disarmament policy as an initiative from the West, which constitutes an opportunity "that should be recognized and should not be passed up." The reactions from the West and from the Warsaw Pact shows that "this initiative can and must be taken seriously", Von Weizsaecker said in an interview with ARD [German television] after his meeting with U.S. President Bush.

The Atlantic alliance has proved, "not for the first time", that the preparation "is not simple, but nevertheless possible", and can reach a "credible result". Because the whole affairs is being played out in public, everybody can see who is taking what position, said Von Weizsaecker, speaking of the public discussions.

Stoltenberg Praises Proposal

AU3005083589 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 30 May 89 p 2

["C.G." report: "Stoltenberg Pays Tribute to Proposal"]

[Text] Bonn, 29 May—At a session of the Federal Executive Committee of the Bundestag Group of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union on Monday, FRG Defense Minister Stoltenberg assessed U.S. President Bush's disarmament proposal as a "positive expansion of and supplement to the Western concept for the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament." This has again put the Vienna negotiation into focus as the most important field of disarmament. Over the past few days the U.S. proposal has been discussed in talks between members of the FRG Government and representatives of the United States and other allies. In Bonn attention was particularly directed

toward the connection between Bush's initiative and the short-range missiles. The FRG Government hopes that the quarrel about the missiles will now become less important.

SDP, CDU/CSU Reaction

LD2905150489 Hamburg DPA in German 1429 GMT
29 May 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The disarmament proposals put forward by U.S. President George Bush have been welcomed in Bonn. SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel spoke of a "significant political effect," before his party committee. Bush is thus regaining the initiative on disarmament. It should now be easier to also make progress on the reduction of short-range nuclear missiles. The early beginning of negotiations to this end, with the goal of a third zero option, "should now for the first time become a real possibility." Nuclear rearmament, pushed forward under the label of modernization, must, however, be finally abandoned.

Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] Bundestag group, stated that the U.S. proposal once again gives the West the offensive. It is a true test for Gorbachev, to see whether he is really ready for the necessary changes in Europe.

FDP Sees SNF Link Implied

LD2905154489 Hamburg DPA in German 1510 GMT
29 May 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—In the view of the FDP [Free Democratic Party], Bush's proposal on concluding the Vienna negotiations on conventional armament within so few months implies, "from the U.S. side too, a clear connection with the decision on short-range missiles." FDP disarmament expert Werner Hoyer stressed that there should not be any delay in beginning negotiations on this, from the German point of view. All NATO countries should be appropriately involved in any reduction of troops.

Greens: Plan 'Praiseworthy,' Transparent

LD2905162989 Hamburg DPA in German 1552 GMT
29 May 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Greens in the Bundestag described Bush's proposals on conventional disarmament as praiseworthy but also very transparent. The U.S. President was not prepared to talk with the USSR, in parallel with these disarmament negotiations, on the subject of the reduction of short-range nuclear missiles, said parliamentary group speaker Helmut Lippelt. The package put forward by Bush is an attempt to prevent a possible and necessary third zero option.

Bush's 'Brilliant Maneuver'

AU3005103789 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 30 May p 3

[Jan Reifenberg commentary: "In Brussels It Is Called a Brilliant Maneuver"]

[Text] Brussels, 29 May—With his disarmament proposal President Bush has not only taken the long-awaited initiative of the West at the Vienna Negotiations on Conventional Stability in Europe (CFE) between the Atlantic and the Urals, but at the same time he has been able to transform a NATO summit which seemed to be threatened by failure because of the quarrel about missiles into a successful meeting worthy of the 40th anniversary of this unique alliance of free and sovereign states. Of course, the three nuclear powers—the United States, Great Britain, and France—have not changed their refusal of early negotiations on the reduction of land-based short-range missiles or even a third zero-option. However, already on Monday [29 May] in Brussels Chancellor Kohl had the opportunity to escape the accusation that he was blocking not only the success of the "summit" with the attitude represented by Genscher but also the success of the Vienna negotiations. According to government spokesman Klein, the chancellor is not "apodictic" in this respect. The working group established at the proposal by NATO Secretary General Woerner on the topic of short-range missiles and headed by his deputy Guidi (the future Italian ambassador to Bonn) was not able to agree on an acceptable formula; thus, the issue was handed over to the foreign ministers in the hope that on Monday an answer satisfactory to all sides would be worked out on the question of modernization and the question of future negotiations.

Waiting for Genscher

Bush's proposal, which the President finally formulated only last week with the approval of the chiefs of the U.S. General Staff and his National Security Council, was assessed as a brilliant maneuver in Brussels, because, first, the President has refuted the accusations leveled against his Administration, also in the United States, that it did not have any effective response to Gorbachev's salvos of proposals and thus ceding ground to the resourceful general secretary in particular with the West European public, which is enthusiastic about detente. Second, with the call to reduce the amounts of troops, combat aircraft, and helicopters, Bush is introducing into the Vienna negotiations those elements that the Soviet Union has always demanded and he is expanding the range of the CFE talks by means of a Western initiative. At the same time, the announcement of the withdrawal of U.S. troops must be considered as a response to corresponding steps by the East but also as a clear signal to Bonn that the commander in chief of all U.S. forces in Europe cannot leave them there without the necessary security provided by all categories of weapons. One could hardly be clearer about the matter than Bush, Mrs Thatcher, and Mitterrand, when they

discussed the question of whether this also applies to nuclear weapons. Therefore, conference observers are asking themselves how Genscher will now integrate the results of the NATO summit in his party policy and represent them as its success.

The fact that the West cannot exclude the topic of combat aircraft from the Vienna negotiations in the long run, has always been clear to the NATO participants in the CFE conference. It was always a question of the time when this should happen and of the air force units that should be included. Even after Bush's proposal, which is aimed at reducing land-based aircraft units and combat and transport helicopters to 15 percent below the current NATO stock, the extremely difficult question of how such units can be registered and which modalities for the elimination of the units that are to be disbanded should be agreed on remains to be answered.

Vienna CFE experts expect the negotiations to take at least 6 years and they always point out that the mobility of airplanes makes it difficult to register them. This is one of the reasons why in Vienna NATO has so far insisted on priority negotiations on the reduction of the actually dangerous disparities of the weapons that can be used for invasions—combat tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers.

Taken at His Word

Obviously President Bush want to "steal the show" from Gorbachev with the proposals for a balanced troop reduction to 275,000 men on each side in the countries where the troops are stationed, because the Soviets can only react positively to this and see it as the long-awaited response to the unilateral withdrawal of a small part of their units from the GDR, Hungary, and the CSSR. Here, too, Bush is advancing into unknown territory, because—in view of the negative experiences with the unsuccessful MBFR negotiations, which lasted 14 years—it was intended to discuss troops at the Vienna talks only after coming to terms with the question of the reduction of weapons that can be used for invasions.

Does Bush only want to call "Gorbachev's bluff" or does he really take the general secretary at his word? At an improvised press conference before lunch on the first day of the summit the President answered this question: "I am not doing this because of the effect on the public. I want to know how serious Gorbachev is and at the same time I want to open a door to a security which would be achieved by both alliances with a smaller stock of armed forces." Visibly pleased, Bush said that the NATO partners obviously like his initiative. However, they were briefed on this initiative only at the weekend by two high-ranking officials of the State Department and the National Security Council, whom Bush sent to the capitals. "With all this Bush has eliminated the impression that he is a temporizer who does not know what he wants and is listening helplessly to the siren songs of the Kremlin," a skeptical Englishman noted.

Thus, the brilliant sunshine over NATO headquarters might be an omen that the alliance has once again been able to successfully avoid an internal crisis. Thus, in the end the Germans, whom most U.S. journalists accompanying Bush—and not only them—criticized with relish on Sunday evening [28 May], might be returning home from the summit a bit ruffled but still with the position due to America's most important alliance partner. This would be to the benefit of everyone. Even if the controversy about short-range missiles remained unsolved and its solution postponed, NATO would appear cohesive in the face of the Eastern initiatives. Those who know about Soviet thinking know that, precisely because of Gorbachev's domestic problems, Moscow shies away from any destabilization: One needs the Americans in Europe, and one also knows that it is inconceivable to completely eliminate nuclear weapons, at least for the foreseeable future.

SDP Critical, FDP Favorable

*LD3005090189 Hamburg DPA in German 0828 GMT
30 May 89*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—While the Free Democratic Party [FDP] in a first comment welcomes the accord of the NATO heads of government in Brussels, the opposition Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] criticized on Tuesday a departure from the current line of the coalition parties.

The SPD party leader and chairman of the parliamentary group Hans-Jochen Vogel sees a "clear discrepancy" between the compromise formula found in the missile quarrel and the original position of the federal government. There can be talk neither of an "early start" to the negotiations on the reduction of short-range missiles nor of "synchronized negotiations" on conventional arms and missiles, Vogel told newsmen in Bonn on Tuesday.

According to the accord accepted by the heads of government in Brussels, negotiations on short-range missiles are to begin only once a treaty has been achieved at the Vienna negotiations on conventional arms and a start with its realization has been made.

This means a "time risk factor" and does not guarantee that a negotiation result will be achieved before 1992 which will "spare us the deployment of new short-range missiles," Vogel said. Likewise the FDP party congress resolution of last weekend does not coincide with the agreement of Brussels.

In contrast, FDP Lower House group chairman Wolfgang Mischnick welcomed the NATO decision. The viewpoints "submitted and persistently pursued by German politics" have obviously convinced. Early practical action will have to follow the proposals. Mischnick thanked Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher "for the consequent action."

Genscher Speaks in Bundestag Debate on SNF Issue, NATO

*LD0106125189 Hamburg DPA in German 1043 GMT
1 Jun 89*

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) [Free Democratic Party] explained [in the Bundestag debate on 1 June] that the missile controversy had led "not to the weakening, but the strengthening" of NATO. The German-U.S. relationship had not been damaged, but gained a new quality. Genscher referred to U.S. President George Bush's statements during his visit to the Federal Republic, saying he considered it significant that Bush had described the Federal Germans as "partners in a leading role."

Bonn had pushed through the German reservations concerning an immediate decision on modernizing short-range missiles and the demand for negotiations on this type of weapon, in the NATO compromise. "We have achieved the central goals of the German foreign and security policy," Genscher said, reporting that the Federal Government had also helped in the formulation of U.S. President George Bush's disarmament offer. The inclusion of troops and aircraft in the proposal was due to German initiative. "Let us not underrate our importance," the foreign minister said.

Now is up to the Federal Republic as well to shape the disarmament process so that there can be no "compulsion for modernization" in the case of short-range nuclear forces. The government will do its utmost to insure that the sought-after negotiations come about soon.

Genscher disputed the opposition's view that London and Washington had agreed to modernize long ago. Earlier, the deputy SPD Bundestag group chairman Horst Ehmke described the Brussels compromise as "dangerous," saying it gave the allies the impression that they could count on the Germans' agreeing to the stationing of short-range nuclear forces in 1992. Ehmke demanded the further development of the NATO strategy, as the concept of flexible response was outmoded.

At the end of the debate, the Bundestag passed a resolution on the NATO summit which was submitted by the coalition groups. Motions by the SPD and Greens which criticized the summit results were rejected.

U.S. Troop Presence in Europe Endorsed

*AU0206084689 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Jun 89 p 1*

[Michael Stuermer commentary: "America in Europe"]

[Excerpts] The presence of U.S. soldiers and their relatives in Europe has always been important. Never before has it been more important than today, since the agreement on intermediate-range nuclear weapons has changed the U.S. guarantees for Europe and has newly

distributed the nuclear burden in the alliance. The U.S. troops contribute to European defense. From the strategic point of view they show the Soviets that extended deterrence is valid. From the political point of view they are the personification of the U.S. security guarantee—one can also say, its hostages. They are backed by a nuclear superpower. Therefore, their importance is different from those of the troops of all other allies.

Today there is the question of how much of European and German security depends on these troops, how much depends on their nuclear weapons, and finally, how much depends on the fact that these weapons are land-based, that is, mainly stationed in the FRG. The first question touches upon the existence or nonexistence of the alliance. The second question is a question of quantity and quality. The third question refers to the burden sharing among the allies. [passage omitted]

Without the presence of the Americans there would be neither a roof over European security nor a ground for West-East arms control, neither the prevention of a nuclear war in Europe nor German participation in making the relevant decisions. The American temptation to say "no nukes, no troops" corresponds to the German temptation to let security dissolve in disarmament. This misses the essential conditions of stability and change, and possibly even the foundations of peace.

Interlacing European and American security needs nuclear weapons in a reasonable and credible scope. The fewer there are, the greater must be their precision, range, and inviolability. This is the price that has to be paid at the present state of technology for avoiding war. If this price seems too high, one has to be aware of what the consequences of not paying it would be.

The currency of military power has had a low exchange rate for some time: However, it will not disappear. There is reason to think about what the presence of the Americans means for this country's security—yesterday, today, tomorrow—and about how the offered reduction of their presence is to be evaluated in this context.

Bush Resolution of NATO Differences Endorsed
AU0506162389 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 3-4 Jun 89 p 4

[Josef Joffe editorial: "Trial of Strength in the Alliance"]

[Text] The crisis is over; is it also solved? The Atlantic alliance ended the recent war of nerves in time for the 40th anniversary summit with brilliant elegance—as if a cunning scenario editor had staged the escalating tensions only in order to get maximum relief and passionate applause afterwards. However, the brilliant 11th hour solution cannot blind us to the fact that differences came to light which have by no means been definitely settled.

Status and Power

The details—when and how a few dozen short-range systems should be negotiated on; whether they should be modernized now, at a later time, or never—at best are understood by those experts who use the lingo of nuclear theologians professionally. Even the informed citizen can only guess what a "throw weight" or a "scatter radius" is; yet he has realized that something basically political is hidden behind the vocabulary of the modern "class of priests." The debate was not about military issues, but about the age-old problem of status and power of countries.

Therefore, the exposed layers of the missile issue were not the most important ones. Was the most important issue really the proper nuclear strategy for the Germans? Then the issue has been discussed in a strange way, because those who believe in the phrase, "the shorter the ranges are, the more dead the Germans are," logically should not have criticized the Lance modernization. It would be a main function of the extension of ranges to 450 kilometers to counter the Germans' "singularization trauma." The successor system would not necessarily have to be aimed at German targets, and in addition, the Federal Republic would not be the only target, because the system could also be deployed in other countries. It would have been much better to have concern about the Germans' fate focused on the much larger arsenal of nuclear artillery which has been modernized for a long time, and the tactical role of which also seems to be increasingly dubious to the "class of priests," and which is in fact only able to devastate German territory.

The second layer—the claim that a small party and its minister had seized the peace flag to ensure their survival beyond the 5-percent clause—is part of the truth, but only part of it; because the question automatically comes up: Why in this field, of all areas—which means, after all, getting into trouble with the three most important allies? And why did the great coalition partner give in to this strategy so quickly? The answer consists of two parts. In domestic policy, disarmament, detente, and "national self-assertion" unite (and inspire) all political camps; in foreign policy, a lone action ceased long ago to be connected with the risks of a loss of security, which in the past made the Germans the model boys in the alliance.

Bush's Wise Course

This brings us to the deepest and most important layer—a concealed trial of strength within the alliance, which incidentally is about the Lance, but which broke out precisely now, and this is no coincidence at all. Alliances are the mirror image of the threat they are exposed to. If the conflict changes, the tissue of the most solid alliance slackens. This is what makes the quarrel over the missiles so exemplary—beyond the nuclear theological dispute and its domestic policy instruments. It was no coincidence either that Bonn played the main part in the drama on the loosening of ties.

The Federal Republic was a product of the cold war and at the same time profited from it; without the "reversal of the alliances," which changed brothers-in-arms (the United States and the USSR) into embittered rivals, the Bonn Republic would not have come about in 1949, nor would it have advanced to become a member of the community of Western states 10 years after the destruction of the 12-year Reich. It is true, Bonn had to pay for this deal, but the profit was immense. In return for the renunciation of part of its sovereignty, the Republic became sovereign; occupiers became allies; the massive militarization of German territory was of little importance as long as it guaranteed security against the East.

Today, 40 years later, the profits have been spent, but the burdens have remained. However, they strain us all the more since the "demand" for military security, as compared to that during the Brezhnev era, has decreased as dramatically as the Federal Republic's weight—in terms of economic power and its strategic situation—has increased. This results in a natural impulse to revise the old "business terms" of the alliance in favor of Bonn.

Remembering the fatal past, people here have not articulated it in this way, but the allies have been very well aware of this basic impulse; this explains the confusion as well as the bitterness on the Western side. Following many weeks of hesitation and exploration, the Bush administration did the right thing to resolve the knots and distortions. Whereas Mrs Thatcher primarily insisted on "containment" toward the Germans, Bush embarked on a wiser course. Whereas the lady insisted on modernization now and negotiations never, Bush accepted and channeled the German claim for revision. One thing can be postponed, and the other one can be tackled very soon—if the Russians cooperate and reduce their military presence in Europe quickly and radically.

Ingenious Superpower Diplomacy

This was a piece of ingenious—if belated—superpower diplomacy. Bonn can chalk up two scores for itself (postponement and negotiations); however, it must keep to the U.S. timetable which allows Washington to determine the negotiation process and its rate in tandem with Moscow. But at the same time, Bush has managed to integrate the annoying missile issue into a larger framework that is filled with the vision of a "whole and free Europe"—which has been a chief concern of every German policy, more than any counting of missiles. The deeper meaning of this was to satisfy and at the same time contain the Germans, to adopt the German urge for more detente, so as to be all the better able to control it.

This strategy reminds us of the best times of U.S. diplomacy toward Europe. That is why the oft-quoted dictum of former British NATO Secretary General Ismay is false, that the alliance has to keep "the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down." To be sure, the "containment" has always also applied to the Germans—however, as compared to the fatal Versailles

system, with this decisive difference: German power was not to be contained under pressure; it was to be contained within a community in which the Federal Republic had an important share. Bismarck defined the essence of his policy by the willingness always to be on the chessboard of European policy together with two others. To assert oneself not by lone action, but with the support of a community, is part of the much cited "German interests" also today.

FRANCE

President Mitterrand Insists on Autonomous Nuclear Deterrence Strategy

*LD3005115889 Paris Domestic Service in French
1100 GMT 30 May 89*

[Text] The French reaction to NATO's pledge for arms negotiations came at the end of the summit from Francois Mitterrand who held a press conference prior to his departure from Brussels:

[Begin Mitterrand recording] Regarding President Bush's proposal on conventional arms and aircraft, I insist that France maintains its stand on the autonomous strategy of nuclear deterrence which means that from the moment that these planes take part in our strategic forces as warhead carriers, France should have the full right of decision, the full freedom to act according to its own wishes—a fact which is in accordance with the very notion of autonomous strategy. I feel that President Bush's proposals are useful, interesting, and positive, and if I have expressed a reservation regarding France, this is solely due to the special status of my country within NATO. As you know, it is not part of the integrated command, and it possesses an autonomous strategy of nuclear deterrence. However, I entirely approve of President Bush's action. [end recording]

Prime Minister Says Nuclear Testing To Be Reduced

*AU0606135489 Paris AFP in English 1336 GMT
6 Jun 89*

[Text] Paris, June 6 (AFP)—Prime Minister Michel Rocard Tuesday said France had decided to reduce the number of nuclear tests at its Pacific testing site on the Mururoa atoll, an official communique said.

The statement was issued by a parliamentary defense committee after Mr. Rocard detailed the military spending reductions announced last month by President Francois Mitterrand to help reduce France's budgetary deficit and finance a major education program.

The prime minister said this would affect certain other programs, including the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier and the naval version of the Rafale fighter plane which would now both enter into service two years behind their initial schedule.

France has carried on a broad program of nuclear testing in the Pacific atoll, with the most recent held on Sunday [4 June], according to New Zealand government seismologists. It was the third test of the year, and the 106th on the site since France began the program in 1975.

The socialist president of the defense committee, Jean-Michel Boucheron, stressed that the 45 billion-franc reduction (6.7 billion dollars) on the planned military budget for 1990 to 1993 "would not threaten the major French defense options".

The initial military equipment budget for this four-year period had planned for investments totalling 474 billion francs (70.7 billion dollars).

ITALY

Prime Minister de Mita: NATO Summit Result on SNF 'Positive'

LD3005193989 Rome International Service in Italian 1730 GMT 30 May 89

[Excerpts] We open our bulletin with the conclusions of the NATO summit in Brussels. Our correspondent reports from the Belgian capital.

[Unidentified reporter] [passage omitted] We asked Italian Prime Minister De Mita—who together with Mr Andreotti, led the Italian delegation at this historic NATO summit—his opinion of the conclusions of the meeting.

[Begin De Mita recording] Well, we have a positive view. I would say that it even comforts us, in our position at the council regarding attempts to emphasize this or that aspect. Our position was to speed up the negotiations on nuclear tactical weapons when useful results can be achieved and to then provide for a reduction in tactical nuclear weapons. Since it seemed to us on these questions there was agreement, the conclusion of the meeting led us to take note of this unity. [end recording]

4 Soviet Officials Arrive for CSCE Inspection

Foreign Ministry Announcement

AU2905111789 Rome ANSA in English 1016 GMT 29 May 89

[Text] (ANSA)—Rome, May 29—Four Soviet Officials arrived in Rome, early Sunday morning, for a two-day confidence-building inspection in central Italy, the Italian Foreign Ministry announced.

The inspection, requested by Soviet authorities under the terms of an agreement reached in 1986 by the 36-nation European Conference on Security and Cooperation (ECSC), is the first to an area where no military activities are known to take place.

The visit is the first to Italy by Eastern bloc inspectors since Bulgarian officials watched NATO manoeuvres in Sardinia last May. Italian inspectors recently visited the Soviet Union.

Sites Named; Departure

AU3105085989 Rome ANSA in English 0825 GMT 31 May 89

[Excerpts] (ANSA) Rome [no date as received]—The four Soviet officials who carried out a two-day confidence-building inspection in central Italy returned to Moscow Tuesday [30 May] with the group's leader, Colonel Vladimir Danilov, affirming on departure "we are convinced our visit will help achieve greater detente between our two nations." [passage omitted]

In particular, the four Soviet inspectors visited an area north of Fiumicino, outside Rome, Grosseto (Tuscany) and L'Aquila (Abruzzo). [passage omitted]

PORTUGAL

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva Hails 'Success' of NATO Summit

LD3005205689 Lisbon International Service in Portuguese 1830 GMT 30 May 89

[Text] Portuguese Prime Minister Cavaco Silva today described the NATO summit as a success and an important victory both for the Atlantic Alliance and for collective peace and security. A very good compromise has been achieved, he stressed, adding that this was due to the outstanding work of the ministers of foreign affairs, whose work on the global concept document ended only in the early hours of this morning. The head of the government spoke of the conclusion of the summit in the following terms:

[Begin Cavaco Silva recording] In the end, this NATO summit has proved a success. It has been an important victory for the Atlantic alliance. But above all, I regard it as a victory for general peace and security.

The alliance is celebrating its 40th anniversary. These have been 40 years of peace from which the Portuguese have also benefitted, since NATO provides our collective defense system. I believe that important steps have been taken to ensure security and peace with the lowest possible levels of armament.

Portugal fully supports President Bush's proposals aimed at giving a new boost to the conventional arms negotiations. I believe that the allies have seized the initiative by putting forward the proposals agreed at the summit with regard to conventional weapons. [end recording]

[Announcer] At this press conference [venue not given] Cavaco Silva said he was convinced that representatives of East and West could be sitting round a table in less than a year to discuss the question of short-range missiles in Europe.

[Begin Cavaco Silva recording] The door has been opened to negotiations on short-range missiles, but a very clear linkage has been established between negotiations on short-range missiles and progress in the conventional arms negotiations. There is a strong hope that agreement will be reached on conventional armaments within 6 to 12 months. Should an agreement be reached in this area so as to reduce the huge superiority presently enjoyed by the East European countries, then it will be possible to commence talks on short-range missiles. [end recording]

[Announcer] That was Prime Minister Cavaco Silva making a positive appraisal of the results of the NATO summit.

SPAIN

Prime Minister Gonzalez Comments on NATO SNF Agreement

Interviewed During Talks

LD2905015389 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish
2100 GMT 28 May 89

[Text] We return to Brussels, the NATO summit. In 15 minutes, a record time, Antonio Casado has prepared for us the urgent report on the meeting which Felipe Gonzalez has just had with journalists. Good evening, Antonio Casado.

[Casado] Good evening. The permanent representatives of the 16 allied countries are currently still seeking a reconciliation formula acceptable to the United States and the FRG in the controversy on short-range nuclear missiles and the more time passes, the more difficult it gets. Thus it cannot be ruled out that the summit may end at midday on Tuesday without the alliance having defined the famous concept, the famous document on the global concept. Observers say it would then be a failure, just when NATO is celebrating its 40th anniversary with this summit. But there is another possibility, the one being attempted, among others, by Spain: that the paragraph concerning short-range missiles be frozen, in the sense of referring to the position adopted by the alliance in 1987 and 1988. A consensus document, even if the question of short-range missiles remains as it was in 1988, is better than no document—this is what Felipe Gonzalez has just said to a group of Spanish journalists at the Hilton Hotel where he is staying and where this evening he received successively between 1800 and 2100 [1600-1900 GMT] his counterparts from Turkey—Ozal; Canada—Mulroney; and Denmark—Schluter. The questions dealt with were bilateral matters, the community summit in Madrid, and also the Atlantic summit in

Brussels. Meanwhile the heads of state and of government who will take part in the NATO summit tomorrow have been arriving this evening, among them U.S. President Bush. In fact, at the airport Felipe Gonzalez was asked what his opinion was about the possibility that U.S. President Bush may announce during the summit a withdrawal of 10 percent of the U.S. forces in Europe.

[Begin Gonzalez recording] This is the direction in disarmament which I think is the new concept of security which must be sought in the new phase of East-West relations—that is to say a security at the lowest possible level. There has already been the odd unilateral gesture on the part of the Warsaw Pact. If there were also some gesture on the part of the West, we would like to see Bush's proposal before commenting on it. I would not regard it as something wrong but rather as the correct path. [end recording]

Sees Important Momentum

LD3105103189 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish
0600 GMT 31 May 89

[Excerpts] [Announcer] All the heads of state or government of the NATO countries have expressed their satisfaction at the results obtained at the recent summit held in Brussels. when it came to assessment and summing up Felipe Gonzalez, the Spanish prime minister, held that we are seeing a new attitude which may be decisive for future East-West relations. Vicente Ortiz.

[Begin recording] [Ortiz] [passage omitted] For Gonzalez the updating of NATO's military doctrine is a collection of quite daring disarmament initiatives in the right direction. A balance at the lowest possible military level is sought and the recovery of the initiative by the alliance was something everyone was calling for. Now the West has outlined a program and timetable. Prime minister Felipe Gonzalez:

[Gonzalez] My impression is that we have a very important disarmament negotiation momentum. It is clear there will be great resistance to it. I think it is no use deceiving oneself, there will be great resistance. Firstly, because it is very complex technically, and secondly because there are many people who do not like it. On both sides, let us not deceive ourselves. But the momentum has started and I think it is important that this starting up of a momentum is not purely a matter of a declaration. As well as a declaration it has a program and a timetable.

[Ortiz] In both documents, the political one and the military one, the 16 lay down timescales. An agreement must be reached with the Pact in less than a year on conventional forces. Only after that would the negotiations for a partial reduction of the short-range missiles come. According to Felipe Gonzalez an important merit of the Atlantic declaration is not speaking out either in favor of or against the triple zero option—the disappearance of all nuclear forces from Europe.

[Gonzalez] So what I believe stems from this declaration is that the triple zero option is not on the agenda. This does not mean that the temptation has been fallen into—and in my view that would have been absurd—to close for evermore—something I think is extraordinarily dangerous in politics—the door to that possibility. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Hails NATO Recovery of Initiative

*LD3005143389 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish
1200 GMT 30 May 89*

[Excerpts] The NATO meeting in Brussels ended with agreement this morning. The final document has the approval of the 16 heads of state or of government present at the summit. RNE's [Spanish radio] correspondent in the European capital Luz Rodriguez has the details:

[Rodriguez] [passage omitted] Here is Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez.

[Begin Gonzalez recording] I think the summit has turned out very well, and of course in completely the opposite direction to the fears that had been building up for weeks and weeks. It is a debate that has lasted for a long time. [end recording]

[Announcer] That was the prime minister speaking after the meeting at a press conference following a summit crowned with success and an intense night of negotiations. RNE's diplomatic correspondent Antonio Casado was following Felipe Gonzalez's statements. Good afternoon.

[Casado] Good afternoon. Felipe Gonzalez's statements confirm, in more detail, this first optimistic impression reported by Luz Rodriguez. According to Felipe Gonzalez, the declaration on East-West relations is innovative and progressive. As for the document on security and disarmament, he thinks it contains quite daring initiatives, in addition to having resolved the controversy about missiles to everyone's liking. In general the Spanish prime minister believes that, as he hoped, the Atlantic alliance has recovered the initiative:

[Begin Gonzalez recording] This recovery of the initiative by the alliance was something we needed and which some of us were calling for. I always say this in a sufficiently modest way because I know the limited role a middle-sized country like ours can play in these forums, although I could also say I would have wanted as an objective of this meeting a declaration like the one that came out of it, and I would also have wanted to overcome the problem of short-range missiles as it has been overcome. This means one can also feel satisfied from a personal point of view and from that of the country. [end recording]

[Casado] That is what Felipe Gonzalez said at a press conference with Spanish reporters an hour ago. On his meeting with George Bush this morning, he praised the

diplomacy of consultations which appears to mark the style of the new U.S. President. Now it is not a matter of the United States conveying what they are intending to do. Now they consult with their allies on what ought to be done. This is what Felipe Gonzalez said and this is what Bush may have done this morning with Felipe Gonzalez about the Central American conflict, which was the focus of the talks. In fact U.S. President Bush, before starting, remarked to Felipe Gonzalez that in his contacts with the South American leaders they had all referred him to him as one of the politicians who best know the Central American, and Latin American in general, political scene, and that therefore he was pleased at the opportunity to meet this morning in order to think together about the problems of this region.

Foreign Minister Fernandez Ordonez Evaluates NATO SNF Agreement

*LD3005092189 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish
0600 GMT 30 May 89*

[Telephone interview with Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez by unidentified announcer—live]

[Excerpts] NATO, an organization which has always been characterized by the ambiguity of its agreements, has given further proof of the high diplomatic spirit which prevails over its meetings. Thus in the early hours of this morning and after over 8 hours of discussion, the foreign ministers of the 16 alliance countries finally found a compromise solution to the controversy on the reduction of short-range missiles which had brought the United States and the FRG into conflict. [passage omitted] Our correspondent Luz Rodriguez reports from Brussels:

[Rodriguez] [passage omitted] Spanish Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez did not offer any details when he left the NATO headquarters in the early hours of this morning after a long 8-hour session juggling with formulas for what is known as the Global Concept, but the session did end with applause.

[Begin Fernandez Ordonez, recording] Well, I think it is a good day for the alliance because first there were Bush's proposals and the declaration was approved, the Global Concept. I believe it is a good result for the summit, because the truth is that a few days ago none of us were putting much money on this summit. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Good morning Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez.

[Fernandez Ordonez] Good morning.

[Announcer] We have already heard in our Brussels correspondent's report that an agreement has been reached between the 16 NATO ministers about the future negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range missiles. How should this agreement be evaluated, Minister?

[Fernandez Ordonez] Well an agreement was reached between the foreign ministers but the heads of government have to give it final approval. I hope things don't get difficult again! Well, the agreement is that the document called the Global Concept, which refers to the whole strategy of the Atlantic alliance, has been approved, a declaration has been approved. And in addition, in this alliance summit, which is the 40th anniversary of the alliance, there has been the offer made by President Bush concerning the reduction of the U.S. military presence in Europe, which is very important. One of the points on which there were most difficulties in the Global Concept was that of the so-called short-range missiles, and some decisions of a certain importance have been taken on this point on which there were many difficulties, even talk of a crisis in the Atlantic alliance.

[Announcer] The crisis at age 40?

[Fernandez Ordonez, laughing] The crisis at 40. For Spain it's only a few—I think about 4—years.

[Announcer] Does the document which is to be drafted and which still has to be approved by the heads of state, or of government, of the NATO countries satisfy the two parties which were most in conflict—namely the United States and Federal Germany.

[Fernandez Ordonez] I think so. I came out with the German minister, with Genscher, and he was quite satisfied. It was a very hard day; we met for 8 hours, over 8 hours—from 1600 until practically 0100—and I think they are, I think both sides are satisfied. The basic problem there was whether or not there were going to be negotiations on short-range missiles. The answer is yes, linked to the conventional arms negotiations. And then whether or not there is going to modernization. The answer is that modernization will be decided in 1992. Basically those were the two major questions.

[Announcer] Yes, because in an 8-hour meeting between 16 foreign ministers the nuances which might be introduced are of enormous importance and that's why there was so much discussion wasn't it?

[Fernandez Ordonez] Well, it was almost a meeting of a drafting group. Because what there was was a rough draft full of parentheses and objections and what it was was a drafting group. From the Spanish point of view I can say that it was not a meeting of great importance for us, from the Spanish point of view and therefore, as you

explained before, there was above all the conflict between the FRG on the one hand and the United States and the UK on the other. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Thank you very much, Minister. Good morning.

[Fernandez Ordonez] Thank you very much.

TURKEY

Government Statement on Short-Range Nuclear Arms

TA2705105889 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish
1000 GMT 27 May 89

[Text] It has been announced that Turkey does not agree to the total elimination of short-range nuclear weapons, which have an important place in the implementation of NATO's frontline defense and flexible response strategies.

The Foreign Ministry announced the resolutions adopted by the National Security Council yesterday in connection with the modernization of short-range weapons, the balancing of these weapons at lower levels, and the line to be followed at the NATO summit on 29 May 1989.

The Foreign Ministry points out that Turkey has always sincerely supported the efforts to balance both conventional and nuclear weapons at the lowest possible levels. The statement says: Our country believes that NATO's strategies of frontline defense and flexible response, the basic aim of which is deterrence, retain their validity. The important point here is to ensure that the weapons that will be balanced at the lowest possible level are maintained in a way and level that will not weaken deterrence and defense. Within this framework, and under the present conditions, it will not be appropriate to totally eliminate the short-range nuclear weapons that have an important place in the implementation of the Alliance's strategies.

The Foreign Ministry says that it is pleased by the Soviet Union's announcement that it intends to unilaterally reduce its conventional and short-range nuclear weapons. It adds: We hope that this reduction will be carried out to a point where a balance can be struck both in the conventional and short-range nuclear weapons. On the other hand, after concrete results are obtained in the conventional force reduction talks in Vienna, the issue of further reducing short-range nuclear weapons can be discussed.

The Foreign Ministry also points out that the National Security Council believes that it would be more appropriate to discuss the elimination of the imbalance in the short-range nuclear weapons before the talks on the long-range weapons are concluded.

The statement points out that, from the beginning, Turkey has supported nuclear policies that are in line with the strategies of the Alliance, the just sharing of the joint defense burden, and the principles of being a responsible ally. Turkey also believes, the statement says, that the differences of view among the allies regarding the short-range nuclear missiles can be eliminated at the NATO summit.

UNITED KINGDOM

UK Reservations Prior to NATO SNF Agreement Noted

LD3005102289 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 0903 GMT 30 May 89

[Text] As the NATO talks resumed, Sir Geoffrey said today's agreement had been made possible at least in part by yesterday's conventional forces initiative from President Bush. Sir Geoffrey said: "We are going to press ahead, challenging the Soviet Union to come down to our proposed levels in conventional weapons. "If we do achieve implementation of this major reduction in conventional weapons, then we are ready to look at the possibility of negotiations on short-range nuclear forces, retaining them for the foreseeable future at lower levels." The first priority, he said, was to remove the "huge Soviet surplus" in conventional weapons. Only then could there be any prospect of talks on cutting short-range nuclear arsenals. With guaranteed continued U.S. backing for a Lance missile follow-up weapon, and no prospect of the "third zero", which had been preserved. He denied that the deal was the result of British determination to keep Chancellor Kohl of West Germany in power following elections soon to be held in West Germany. "Obviously we are all interested in each other's domestic political positions, but we have to come to conclusions which are in the interests of the alliance as a whole. We are moving towards a much more secure prospect for Europe, Sir Geoffrey said.

NATO's comprehensive concept document on the alliance's overall strategy, which has taken two years to draw up, stresses that no talk on cuts in SNF [short range nuclear forces] can start before conventional arms reductions are implemented. It calls on the Warsaw Pact to begin a unilateral reduction on its vastly superior numbers of SNF systems before that date. According to President Bush's new timetable for conventional arms talks in Vienna, the West is seeking full implementation of conventional cuts by 1992/93. Talks are therefore unlikely to begin before that date. The paper, which will be published at the end of today's summit, says: "Negotiated reductions leading to a level below the existing level of their SNF missiles will not be carried out until the results of those negotiations have been implemented." British sources made it clear that Sir Geoffrey was unable to give his full backing to the wording of the new agreement, reached after eight hours of talks during the night, before discussing it with the prime minister because of uncertainty over the "third zero". Once Mrs

Thatcher had considered the document in its entirety, she was "completely satisfied" that the "third zero" was ruled out. The document says: "Where nuclear forces are concerned, land, sea and air-based systems, including ground-based missiles, in present circumstances and as far as can be foreseen, will be needed in Europe."

It was this wording which convinced Mrs Thatcher that the total elimination of SNF had been ruled out. At the beginning of today's session, both she and President Bush said the wording of the document made this clear. There was no disagreement from Chancellor Kohl. The document will also contain two British initiatives calling for the removal of borders between the East and the West and the "democratisation" of Eastern European countries. Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov cautiously welcomed Mr Bush's proposals and blamed diplomats in Vienna for the slow pace of negotiations. "It's better to have proposals than to have no proposals and to have proposals to cut and not proposals to modernise armaments," Mr Gerasimov said in a BBC radio interview. Mr Gerasimov, making the first Kremlin comment on Mr Bush's proposals, said he regarded them as fair, but added that Moscow needed time to study them more closely before making a final judgment. The proposals needed further study but his initial response was positive. And he added: "They are a bit late, but better late than never."

Prime Minister Thatcher Calls Agreement 'First Class'

LD3005134289 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1238 GMT 30 May 89

[By Charles Miller and Geoff Meade, PRESS ASSOCIATION, in Brussels]

[Excerpts] Mrs Thatcher was triumphant this afternoon after ensuring the long-term future of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. She said the NATO allies had all signed up to a firm commitment to a mix of weapons, and agreed only to negotiate a "partial" reduction in short-range forces as and when conventional arms reductions were agreed in Vienna.

"Wriggle as some people may, that is what they have signed up to," she declared. "When you sign up to something, you sign up to it—that's that," the prime minister said in a clear reference to the West Germans, who had been pressing for a wider-ranging commitment to remove Lance missiles sited on German soil.

Mrs Thatcher, who hailed today's agreement as "absolutely first class", said: "NATO has made it absolutely certain that short-range nuclear weapons are a vital part of a strong deterrence and therefore they must be kept.

"We have agreed an excellent document. It is certainly one of the best I have a hand in." She was insistent that the final form of words was watertight on the continuation of a nuclear deterrent—a view supported by both US President George Bush and NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner.

She praised Mr Bush for a "timely and measured" proposal on US- Soviet cuts in troops and military hardware. "It was measured and imaginative and perhaps it had a psychological impact, which is no bad thing, which lifted the whole thing," she said.

Mrs Thatcher's support for Mr Bush's proposals, which were announced yesterday, are conditional on Britain's dual-capability strike aircraft not being included in the aircraft reductions for which the President has called. She said that stance had been made perfectly clear by Britain and France, and she was happy that there was no suggestion that such aircraft should be included.

Asked about the detail of the final declaration of the summit—which marks the alliance's 40th anniversary—and the extent of the safeguards on NATO's future nuclear strategy, Mrs Thatcher said: "Read the document, just read it. The words are very clear." She said it

left no doubt that a conventional forces mix was needed and that "you simply cannot obviate the need for short-range nuclear missiles". The way had been opened for negotiations on "partial" short-range nuclear reductions, but only when any conventional arms agreement hammered out at Vienna had been implemented, which the Americans wanted to happen by 1992/3.

Mr Bush said the allies had specifically ruled out any possibility of a "third zero". The comprehensive concept talked of negotiations to achieve a "partial" reduction of short-range nuclear weapons. "Partial means partial. To interpret it any other way misses the boat," Mr Bush said.

NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner hailed the summit as a triumph, saying it proved the alliance was vigorous, strong and cohesive.

He ruled out the possibility of a nuclear-free Europe, saying NATO wanted to maintain a mix of nuclear and conventional forces while reducing them to a minimum level. "But we do not want a nuclear-free Europe. We are interested in a Europe where no war remains thinkable," he said. [passage omitted]

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